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Policy Summary
Displaced workers are usually defined as persons on layoff with a stable 
employment history who have little chance of being recalled to jobs with their 
old employer or even in their old industry. The need to seek reemployment 
in a new occupation or industry sometimes requires that displaced workers 
acquire the vocational skills needed in expanding industries, and may also re 
quire the enhancement of long-forgotten job search skills. Retraining is broadly 
defined to include both.
As stated by the author, the principal roles for publicly sponsored retrain 
ing programs are twofold: (1) to reduce the private and social costs associated 
with unnecessary delays hi the reemployment process, and (2) to assist in the 
replacement of specific human capital lost when a permanent layoff takes place. 
This study examines nine different demonstration projects and operating pro 
grams to determine how well public retraining programs for displaced workers 
fulfill these roles.
The book attempts to answer four policy questions regarding the effectiveness 
of retraining programs in speeding up the reemployment of workers displaced 
from jobs by permanent layoffs or plant closures:
  Do some types of training work better than others?
  Do some groups of workers benefit more from training than others?
  To the extent that training improves reemployment prospects, does it 
work by increasing post-training wage rates or by reducing the duration 
of unemployment?
  Referring specifically to vocational training, how do we know what to
train workers to do?
One unambiguous finding of the study is that job search assistance strongly 
affects a variety of labor market outcomes, including earnings, placement and 
employment rates, and level of UI benefits. Given its cost effectiveness, the 
evidence analyzed in this study suggests that job search assistance should be 
the core of any adjustment assistance services offered displaced workers. With 
respect to other services, however, the evidence is not as conclusive. There 
is no clear evidence that either classroom or on-the-job training has a signifi 
cant net impact on employment or earnings. The author proposes an agenda 
for future research, including the collection of additional evidence on the deter 
minants of success or failure of training programs.
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Introduction
For more than 25 years the federal government and individual 
state governments have provided retraining programs to ease the la 
bor market adjustments required of workers directly or indirectly dis 
placed from their jobs by a mass layoff or plant closure. Displaced 
workers are usually defined as persons on layoff who possess a sta 
ble employment history. In addition to their work experience, the 
main distinction between displaced and other laid-off workers is that 
the displaced have little chance of being recalled to jobs with their 
old employer or even in their old industry. Displaced workers are 
therefore said to be "permanently" laid off.
The report of the Secretary of Labor's Task Force on Economic 
Adjustment and Worker Dislocation (1986: 13-16) presents a useful 
capsule description of the characteristics of displaced workers. 
Drawing on the information available for individual displaced work 
ers in the 1984 and 1986 Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS), the re 
port points out that almost 50 percent of displaced workers had lost 
jobs in manufacturing, mostly in durable goods manufacturing indus 
tries such as primary metals and transportation equipment. Only 20 
percent of all employed workers and about 23 percent of all unem 
ployed workers, in contrast, are associated with manufacturing. In 
addition, the displaced were disproportionately blue-collar workers 
concentrated in the Midwest and other sections of the country with a 
heavy manufacturing base.
As compared to the workforce as a whole, the Task Force report 
also notes that displaced workers endure significantly longer spells of 
unemployment following layoff. In particular, there is a much smaller 
fraction of the displaced in the 1- to 4-week unemployment dura 
tion category and a much larger fraction in the 15- to 26-week cate 
gory. Because layoffs tend to be permanent rather than temporary,
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moreover, occupational mobility is higher for displaced workers than 
for other workers. About one-half of those displaced workers reem- 
ployed as of January 1984 had made a major occupational change. 
Using 1984 DWS data, Flaim and Sehgal (1985) also point out that 
about 30 percent of displaced workers reemployed in full-time wage 
and salary jobs suffered an earnings loss of 20 percent or more and 
that nearly one-quarter of reemployed displaced workers failed to 
regain the group health insurance coverage they enjoyed on their 
lost job. Not to be overlooked, finally, are the severe emotional 
adjustments required of workers abruptly displaced from jobs they 
perceived as "good jobs" and expected to retain into the foresee 
able future.
The need to seek reemployment in a new occupation or industry 
may require that displaced workers tool up in the vocational skills 
required to qualify for jobs in expanding industries. A stable work 
history suggests, moreover, that the job search skills of many dis 
placed workers are likely to have grown rusty from disuse because of 
a lengthy attachment to the pre-layoff employer. For the second of 
these reasons, retraining is defined broadly to include the enhance 
ment of job search skills in addition to the traditional focus on vo 
cational training. The principal roles for publicly sponsored 
retraining programs are twofold: (1) to reduce the private and social 
costs associated with unnecessary delays in the reemployment pro 
cess, and (2) to assist in the replacement of specific human capital 
lost when a permanent layoff unexpectedly takes place.
Questions to be Answered
The purpose of this monograph is to answer the following research 
questions involving government training assistance to displaced 
workers:
1. Do some types of training work better than others?
2. Do some groups of workers benefit more from training than 
others?
3. To the extent that training improves reemployment prospects, 
does it work by increasing post-training wage rates or by reducing 
the duration of unemployment?
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4. Referring specifically to vocational training, how do we know 
what to train workers to do?
Question 1 raises the possibility that the major types of training  
classroom training (CT), on-the-job training (OJT), job search assis 
tance (ISA), and remedial education may differ in the benefits they 
offer displaced workers, as well as in their costs. The premise of CT 
is that the specific skills of displaced workers have been made 
largely obsolete, but that skills of potential interest to a number of 
employers can be developed through intensive, formal training in a 
classroom setting. OJT, on the other hand, is appropriate in the ac 
quisition of firm-specific skills that can most efficiently be learned 
on the job. The objective of ISA is basically to assist job-ready 
workers to develop effective job-seeking skills. Finally, remedial ed 
ucation programs are designed to assist the perhaps 20 percent of 
displaced workers who have a deficiency in reading or problem solv 
ing skills severe enough to retard reemployment or even the acquisi 
tion of new job skills.
Question 2 is posed in recognition of the fact that not all displaced 
workers may benefit equally from retraining services and, moreover, 
that not all of these workers are equally in need of adjustment assis 
tance. The analysis of 1984 DWS data by Podgursky and Swaim 
(1987a) shows that the distribution of completed spells of joblessness 
is highly skewed to the right. While nearly half of the respondents in 
their sample found jobs within 14 weeks of displacement, a substan 
tial minority faced a high risk of being jobless for a year or more. It 
is this minority to whom adjustment assistance efforts should be tar 
geted. Podgursky and Swaim loosely identify these individuals to in 
clude workers displaced from blue-collar occupations, workers with 
below-average levels of education, racial minorities and women, and 
residents of communities with above-average unemployment rates. In 
a parallel paper also using DWS data, Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) 
report that a sizable minority of displaced workers mostly workers 
with substantial specific human capital investments experienced 
large and enduring earnings losses upon reemployment.
The distinction made in Question 3 is intended to separate the 
effect of vocational training on labor productivity as measured by a
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higher post-training hourly wage from its effect in speeding up reem- 
ployment by providing a credential that moves workers up in the 
queue for vacant jobs. Question 4, finally, focuses attention on the 
issue of how to identify growth occupations and develop appropriate 
curricula so that successful program graduates have a reasonable 
chance of being hired and retained in training-related jobs.
The policy relevance of these research questions is brought out 
clearly in the provisions of the Economic Dislocation and Worker 
Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) passed by Congress and signed 
into law by President Reagan in August 1988. This act amended the 
existing Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act (JJPA), and 
sharply increased the level of federal funds to be used by the states 
in establishing programs to meet the adjustment assistance needs of 
displaced workers. Program services, many of which were recom 
mended by the Secretary of Labor's Task Force report (1986), are 
described in the enabling legislation under the headings of "basic 
readjustment services" and "retraining services." Basic readjust 
ment services are defined to include such ISA services as outreach 
and orientation, job and career counseling, testing and assessment, 
provision of labor market information, job clubs, job development, 
and supportive services such as child care and commuting assis 
tance. In addition to CT and OJT programs and remedial education, 
retraining services include relocation allowances, literacy and English 
programs for non-English speakers, and entrepreneurial training. The 
act also specifies that funds are not to be spent on public service 
employment (PSE) programs, but that needs-related payments may 
be provided to an eligible displaced worker who does not qualify or 
has ceased to qualify for unemployment compensation in order that 
he or she may participate in training or education programs.
EDWAA thus allows a great deal of latitude in the types of dis 
placed worker programs eligible for federal funding. It is my inten 
tion that the answers to the four research questions posed in this 
chapter will be of assistance to state and federal government officials 
charged with the responsibilities of designing, implementing, oper 
ating, and monitoring the displaced worker programs called for by 
the new legislation.
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Organization of the Study
The monograph begins in chapter 2 with an overview of the exist 
ing evaluations of federally funded Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (CETA) programs. CETA predated JTPA and pro 
vided funding for training and PSE programs during the 1973-82 
period. Although CETA programs were not limited to training assis 
tance or to serving displaced workers, the CETA evaluations are a 
good starting point for two reasons. First, they provide baseline 
quantitative estimates to which the impacts of later programs and 
demonstration projects can be compared. Second and more impor 
tant, a discussion of the CETA evaluations represents an opportunity 
to introduce some of the main methodological issues involved in pro 
gram evaluation.
Chapter 3 is in many respects the heart of the monograph. Here 
the large volume of quantitative evidence generated by four major 
demonstration projects funded by the federal government during the 
1980s is examined in detail. These projects are the Downriver pro 
gram, the Buffalo program of the Dislocated Worker Demonstration 
Project, the Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration (WAD), and 
the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance (UI) Reemployment Dem 
onstration project.
Chapter 4 follows with an analysis of the largely qualitative evi 
dence on the design and implementation of statewide continuing pro 
grams in California and Minnesota. California's Employment 
Training Panel (ETP) provides classroom training to displaced work 
ers and employed workers at risk of displacement, while the Minne 
sota Employment and Economic Development (MEED) program is 
targeted wage-subsidy initiative. Considered also in connection with 
the Minnesota program are results from the federally funded Dayton 
targeted wage-subsidy experiment. This chapter is particularly help 
ful in providing insight into Question 4.
In chapters 5 and 6, the discussion moves from domestic retrain 
ing programs to a consideration of programs provided displaced 
workers by other nations. Examined in chapter 5 are the training 
programs presently in place in Canada and the available quanti 
tative evaluations of the National Institutional Training Program
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(NITP) and the Canadian Manpower Industrial Training Program 
(CMITP). Similarly, chapter 6 discusses Australia's federally funded 
displaced worker programs and presents the main results of an eval 
uation of the Labour Adjustment Training Arrangements (LATA) 
program.
Chapter 7 concludes the monograph with answers to the four pol 
icy questions and an agenda for future research.
2 
CETA Evaluations
The federal government's first comprehensive attempt to provide 
adjustment assistance to displaced workers was the Manpower Devel 
opment and Training Act (MDTA). Passed in 1962, MDTA repre 
sented the response of Congress to a rising national unemployment 
rate coupled with growing concern over the effects of technological 
change on the employment options of mid-career adult workers. 1 
The primary objective of the program was to provide retraining for 
workers whose skills had been made obsolete by new technology. By 
the mid-1960s, however, an improved labor market and lessened con 
cern over automation led to a shift in interest and funding away from 
the reemployment problems of displaced workers and toward the em- 
ployability of disadvantaged young people and welfare recipients.
The next major federal training initiative was the passage in 1973 
of CETA, which consolidated nine earlier programs including 
MDTA. Program services funded under CETA were directed toward 
workers unemployed for both structural and cyclical reasons, and 
program participants typically received income-maintenance sti 
pends. The range of services provided during CETA's 10-year exist 
ence included classroom training, on-the-job training in the private 
sector, PSE, and work experience (subsidized public-sector jobs em 
phasizing work habits and basic skill development designed for indi 
viduals with essentially no prior labor market experience). A small 
number of participants also received job placement services (called 
"direct referrals"). As unemployment rose during the 1970s, CETA 
expenditures shifted away from training programs toward the provi 
sion of PSE job slots. PSE programs typically provided little or no 
training. By 1981, charges of careless management and enrollment 
of ineligible applicants led to the elimination of CETA funding for 
PSE jobs, and CETA itself was not renewed at its scheduled 1982 
expiration data. 2
8 CETA Evaluations
Methodological Approaches
A number of evaluation studies of MDTA programs appeared in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, but these early attempts at evaluation 
were generally hampered by the lack of a comparison or control 
group, as well as the absence of good information on earnings. 3 The 
fundamental problem in program evaluation is developing a reliable 
methodology for assessing what would have happened to participants 
had they not enrolled in the program. Without a comparison or con 
trol group, analysts interested in obtaining net impact estimates are 
basically limited to using participants as their own control group by 
comparing post-program labor market outcomes like earnings with 
the level of participants' own pre-program earnings. Referring to the 
taxonomy in table 2.1, this is the first of the four methodological 
approaches used in the evaluation reports described in this study. 
The major difficulty with the pre-program/post-program approach is 
that the pre-program dip in earnings that caused workers to seek to 
enroll in the program in the first place may be merely a temporary 
interruption in their permanent time path of earnings. If the pre 
program dip is caused by some transitory labor market phenomenon, 
the program would receive "credit" for a rebound in earnings that 
would have happened anyway. In addition, all other events that are 
time conditional (e.g., an upturn in the economy) are assumed con 
stant an assumption which is patently false.
The second methodological approach described in table 2.1 in 
volves constructing a comparison group from data on program- 
eligible workers who did not, for whatever reason, participate in the 
program. This methodology has the advantage of making it unneces 
sary to control statistically for differences between members of the 
treatment and comparison groups since they are drawn from the 
same population. It has the important disadvantage, however, of 
bringing to the forefront the problem of "selection bias." This prob 
lem arises because program participants both choose to enroll and 
are selected by program operators. Thus, personal characteristics 
such as ability and motivation that are unobservable to the analyst 
are likely to lead to a positive correlation between program partici 
pation and the error term in the earnings equation. In other words, a
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Table 2.1
Taxonomy of Methodological Approaches to Estimating 
______________Net Program Impacts______________
Programs and
Methodological demonstrations 
approach _____ Discussion ___ examined
Pre-program/ 
post-program 
comparison
Use of a self- 
selected comparison 
group composed of 
nonparticipants from 
the program-eligible 
population
Use of an external 
comparison group
Use of a randomly 
selected control 
group from the 
program-eligible 
population
Earnings of participants are likely to re 
cover from their "pre-program dip" even 
in the absence of the program. Hence, the 
effect of the program will be overstated.
Has the advantage that participants and 
comparison group members are drawn from 
the same population, but the disadvantage 
of the "selection bias" that results if par 
ticipants would have had different earnings 
than nonparticipants, even in the absence 
of the program.
Since participants and nonparticipants are 
not drawn from the same population, it is 
necessary to control statistically for differ 
ences between participants and comparison 
group members. This is accomplished by 
(1) specifying an earnings function that 
would prevail for both groups in the ab 
sence of the program (which may also in 
clude observable determinants of the 
participation decision) and/or (2) selecting 
a "matched" subsample that has approxi 
mately the same characteristics on average 
as the participant sample.
By randomly assigning participants and 
nonparticipants, selection bias is avoided 
by directly breaking the link between par 
ticipation and unobservable determinants 
of earnings.
California's ETP and 
Canada's CMITP
Canada's NITP and 
Australia's LATA
CETA, Down 
river, and Buffalo 
nontarget-plant 
sample
Buffalo target-plant 
sample, Texas' WAD, 
the New Jersey UI 
demonstration, and 
the Dayton wage- 
subsidy experiment
selection bias arises because the earnings of program graduates 
would differ from the earnings of nonparticipants, even in the ab 
sence of the program.
Although a few of the programs examined in this study have been 
evaluated using either the pre-program/post-program approach or a 
self-selected nonparticipant comparison group, most of the evalua 
tions considered provide net impact estimates based on either an ex-
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ternally selected comparison group or a randomly selected control 
group drawn from the program-eligible population. An important 
feature of CETA was that, for the first time, the U.S. Department of 
Labor (USDOL) funded the development of a data base specifically 
designed for program evaluation. Termed the Continuous Longitudi 
nal Manpower Survey (CLMS), this data base includes three compo 
nents: (1) data for random samples of CETA enrollees collected 
quarterly beginning in 1975, (2) data for comparison groups drawn 
from March Current Population Survey (CPS) files, and (3) Social 
Security earnings records for each CETA enrollee and each member 
of the CPS comparison groups. Thus, the methodological approach 
to program evaluation permitted by CLMS data involves the use of 
an externally selected comparison group in this case, a sample 
drawn from the CPS. As noted in table 2.1, a general problem with 
this third methodology is that differences between the treatment and 
comparison groups will exist because they are not drawn from the 
same population. The two groups are therefore not statistically 
equivalent. In the particular case of CLMS data, CETA eligibility 
was generally restricted to individuals in low-income families, with 
the result that CETA enrollees differ from members of the nationally 
representative CPS sample in terms of such characteristics as previ 
ous work experience and education.
The important advantage of the fourth methodological approach  
that involving random assignment of program-eligible workers to 
treatment and control groups is that the link is broken between pro 
gram participation and unobservable determinants of earnings. This 
allows unbiased net program effects to be obtained. Most analysts 
therefore conclude that randomized experiments are necessary to 
produce reliable estimates of program impacts (see, for example, 
Fraker and Maynard 1987; and LaLond 1986). In defending the value 
of nonexperimental methods of program evaluation, however, Heck- 
man, Hotz, and Dabos (1987: 421-24) emphasize the costs and prac 
tical difficulties of conducting social experiments and, in their view, 
the limited value of experimental data. They note, in particular, that 
participation in a training program entails a multistage process of 
application, selection, continuation in the program until completion,
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and job placement. An experimental assessment of the effect of 
training conditional on completing each stage of the process requires 
random assignment of each stage something that is rarely done in 
social experiments. Hence, a case can be made that nonexperimental 
methods have a role to play in realistic plans of program evaluation.
Evaluation Results
Barnow (1987) provides a useful survey of 11 major CETA evalu 
ations. Table 2.2 summarizes the net impact estimates presented in 
the five studies he surveyed that use data for adult workers and that 
provide some breakdown in the results by sex, race, and type of pro 
gram service. Also shown are results from a recent CETA evaluation 
by Finifter (1987). The estimates measure the impact of CETA on 
the first year of post-program earnings for participants enrolled in 
1975 and/or 1976 net of the earnings of the CPS comparison group. 
Since PSE and work experience offered enrollees relatively little 
training, the table focuses on training opportunities supplied through 
classroom and on-the-job training.
Three conclusions appear to be warranted. First, most of the esti 
mates shown in the table for women are larger than those for men, 
with the male estimates often being zero or even negative. Bloom 
and McLaughlin (1982) suggest in this connection that regardless of 
program activity, the main effect of CETA training was to facilitate 
labor market entry. Thus, persons who were out of the labor market, 
primarily women, enjoyed a larger program impact than those with 
extensive but unsuccessful labor market experience, primarily men. 
If Bloom and McLaughlin's suggestion is correct, however, the net 
impact estimates for women will be upwardly biased to the extent 
that female labor force entrants are not a random sample of all 
women.
The second conclusion is that on-the-job training is typically more 
effective than classroom training, particularly for minority enrollees. 
The larger impact for OJT than CT is to be expected since the most 
job-ready of enrollees are those likely to be selected by employers 
for OJT slots. Relative to classroom training, OJT may also have a 
larger impact on earnings in the short run than in the long run be-
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Table 2.2
Estimated CETA Net Impacts on Earnings of Adult Workers, 
by Sex and Race
Study
Westat (1981)
CT
OJT
Overall
Bassi (1983)
CT
OJT
Overall
Bloom & McLaughlin
(1982)
CT
OJT
White
$400
750
200
 
 
 
300
-200
Men
Minority
$ 200
1,150
200
582-773
2,053-2,057
117-211
300
1,500
Women
White
$550
550
500
63-205
80-382
740-778
1,300
1,200
Minority
$ 500
1,200
600
426-633
1,368-1,549
426-671
1,100
800
Overall 200
Dickinson, Johnson & West (1986) 
CT -343 
OJT -363 
Overall -690
Geraci (1984) 
CT 
OJT 
Overall
Finifter (1987) 
CT 
OJT 
Overall
372
612
-9 
686
800-1,300
0
35
13
1,201
882
507
723
Sources. Barnow (1987: table 3) for the Westat through Geraci studies, and Finifter (1987: 
table 1).
Note: "Overall" refers to the combined impact of CT, OJT, PSE, work experience, and 
multiple activities   indicates that an estimate is not reported.
cause job retention is usually assured for a short time after the sub 
sidy period ends.
Finally, the range of CETA net impact estimates shown in table 
2.2 is uncomfortably wide. At first glance it may seem odd that stud 
ies using the same data set to estimate the same treatment effect 
should arrive at such different estimates. The basic problem is that
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the absence of a classical experiment in which sample members are 
randomly assigned to either the treatment group or the control group 
requires CLMS users to make a number of critical decisions. Most of 
these decisions involve (1) controlling for differences between mem 
bers of the treatment and comparison groups, and (2) coping with 
the selection bias problem. With respect to the first issue, analysts of 
CLMS data have proceeded by specifying an earnings function that 
would prevail for both groups in the absence of the program and/or 
selecting a subsample of CPS respondents that matches CETA par 
ticipants on a number of key variables determining earnings. The 
purpose of drawing a matched comparison sample is to reduce pre 
program differences between the CETA and CPS samples so that the 
regression estimates will be less sensitive to the incorrect specifica 
tion of the post-program earnings function. Weighting the observa 
tions in the earnings regression is also used to make mean values of 
the explanatory variables more alike in the treatment and comparison 
groups.
The seriousness of the selection bias problem appears to be re 
duced in CETA evaluations because the comparison group is drawn 
from CPS data rather than from the self-selected population of 
program-eligible nonparticipants. Nevertheless, program participa 
tion is not a random event; participants must have passed through a 
multistage screening process. Analysts of CLMS data have therefore 
pursued a number of different approaches in attempting to deal with 
the selection bias problem. In increasing order of complexity, these 
include (1) specifying additional explanatory variables in the post- 
program earnings equation to capture factors believed to be impor 
tant in the selection process, (2) making specific assumptions about 
unobservable variables invariant over time which potentially affect 
both program selection and earnings in an attempt (typically using a 
first-difference estimator) to eliminate correlation in the earnings 
equation between the error term and the training variable, and (3) 
explicitly modeling the selection process in a separate participation 
equation and then jointly estimating the participation and earnings 
equations. The results reported by different analysts may clearly 
vary in important respects depending on the specification of the
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earnings function, the matching technique used, the attempt, if any, 
to model the selection procedure, the assumptions made about unob- 
servable variables, and the decision reached on whether and how to 
weight CPS observations.
The multiplicity of decisions required of CLMS users makes it dif 
ficult to assess the extent to which differences in methodological ap 
proach account for the wide range of net impact estimates displayed 
in table 2.2. Fortunately, Dickinson, Johnson, and West (1986) per 
form the useful service of trying to reconcile their very low and 
even, for men, negative impact estimates with the sizable positive 
estimates reported for both men and women in the influential study 
by Westat (1981). Their analysis suggests that Westat's results are 
quite sensitive to (1) the omission of pre-enrollment earnings in the 
post-program earnings regressions and (2) the decision to include in 
the comparison sample persons without strong labor market ties. 
When pre-enrollment earnings are controlled for and persons without 
strong labor market ties are excluded from the comparison sample, 
Dickinson, Johnson, and West report that Westat's methodology 
would result in substantially lower net impact estimates of -$529 for 
adult men and $299 for adult women. This estimate for men is in 
roughly the same ballpark as the overall estimate of -$690 shown in 
table 2.2 for the authors' own study. With respect to female CETA 
participants, it is interesting to note that Dickinson, Johnson, and 
West conclude that their overall impact estimate reported in the table 
of just $13 per year is likely to be on the conservative side, and that 
an estimate on the order of $200 to $300 (i.e., an estimate close to 
the revised Westat estimate of $299) is more reasonable.
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NOTES
1. Also passed in 1962, the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program was created to pro 
vide income support and retraining to workers who lost jobs in industries adversely affected by 
foreign imports. The TAA program is discussed at greater length in chapter 6 in connection 
with the Australian Structural Adjustment Assistance (SAA) program.
2. Levitan and Gallo (1988) provide an interesting discussion of the demise of CETA and 
its replacement by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), along with a spirited defense 
of CETA.
3. An important exception is Ashenfelter's (1978) study of the impact of MDTA-funded CT 
programs using as a comparison group a sample drawn from the Continuous Work History 
Sample maintained by the Social Security Administration. Ashenfelter reports for males that 
the net impact of training on annual earnings is between $150 and $500 in the year immedi 
ately following training, declining to about half these amounts after five years. For females, 
the net impact estimates are between $300 and $600, with no evidence of a decline in suc 
ceeding years.

3
Evidence From U.S. 
Demonstration Projects
The CETA program expired in 1982 with the national economy 
mired in the trough of the deepest recession since the 1930s. Rather 
than renewing the CETA program with its politically unpopular em 
phasis on PSE, extended negotiations between President Reagan and 
Congress resulted in a broad new program the Job Training Part 
nership Act (JTPA) to train and place workers in private-sector 
jobs. Title III of JTPA is specifically directed at assisting displaced 
workers. l Relative to CETA, the new legislation gives increased re 
sponsibility to state governments for planning and implementing dis 
placed worker programs. Moreover, it defines a more active role for 
the business community in program development through the estab 
lishment of Private Industry Councils (PICs). Finally, JTPA differs 
from CETA in its concentration of resources on training and JSA 
services rather than PSE and income maintenance and in its require 
ment that numerical performance standards be used in assessing lo 
cal program success.
Because many displaced workers failed to satisfy the income test 
required for program eligibility, the experience gained from CETA 
programs was of limited usefulness in shaping the direction of new 
Title III JTPA programs. Rising unemployment and an increasing 
number of plant closures led the USDOL to begin funding in 1980 a 
series of demonstration projects intended to test the effectiveness of 
alternative reemployment services in placing displaced workers in 
private-sector jobs. This chapter examines the results of four major 
demonstration projects starting, in chronological order, with the 
Downriver displaced worker program. Table 3.1 presents an over 
view of the four demonstrations indicating the time periods during 
which the programs were in operation, the groups of displaced work-
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Table 3.1 
Characteristics of Major Displaced Worker Demonstrations
Demonstra- Time 
tion project period
Downriver:
Phase I July 1980-
Sept. 1981
Phase II Nov. 1981-
Sept. 1983
Buffalo:
Target Oct. 1982-
plant Sept. 1983
Nontarget
plant
Texas WAD:
Houston 1983-85
El Paso
New Jersey UI July 1986-
project fall 1987
Targeted 
workers
Experienced male
workers laid off
from particular
auto and auto
parts plants
Experienced male
workers laid off
from 6 steel and
auto plants
Experienced male
workers laid off
from 3 other steel
and auto plants or
from over 300
other establish 
ments
Mostly male pro 
fessional workers
laid off from
petrochemical
plants eligible for
Title III JTPA
programs
Mostly female
Hispanic workers
laid off from
light manufactur 
ing plants eligible
for Title III JTPA
programs
Male and female
UI claimants with
at least 3 years of
tenure
Sample size
388 treatment;
384 comparison
594 treatment;
341 comparison
281 treatment;
516 comparison
251 treatment;
470 comparison
470 treatment;
164 control
362 treatment;
312 control
8,675 treatment;
2,385 control
Evaluation 
method
Comparison
group drawn ran 
domly from other
auto plants
Random assign 
ment of program
slots to treatment
and control
groups
Self-selected
treatment and
comparison
groups
Random assign 
ment of eligible
workers to treat 
ment and control
groups
Random assign 
ment of eligible
workers to treat 
ment and control
groups
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ers to which services were targeted, sample sizes, and differences in 
evaluation methodologies.
The Downriver Program
The Downriver displaced worker program was conceived by the 
Downriver Community Conference a consortium representing six 
teen communities in the southwestern suburbs of Detroit in re 
sponse to the closing of a BASF auto parts plant in April 1980. 
Downriver staff members moved quickly following the plant closing 
announcement to develop a service delivery plan to assist in the re- 
employment of about 700 laid-off BASF workers. During the sum 
mer of 1980, the USDOL became interested in the Downriver 
program as a possible model for the development of a national dis 
placed worker program. An initial federal grant of $1.2 million al 
lowed the program to expand its target population to include 1,100 
workers permanently laid off from a nearby DANA auto parts plant. 
Comparison plants selected for this first phase of the program were a 
Lear-Siegler Corporation plant and the Chrysler Huber Avenue 
Foundry, both of which were closed permanently during the summer 
of 1980. Phase I of the program continued from July 1980 through 
September 1981.
Based on the first year's performance, an additional federal grant 
of $3.825 million was awarded to extend Downriver program ser 
vices to about 2,000 workers laid off from the Ford Motor Com 
pany's Michigan Casting Company (MCC) plant. This second phase 
of the program was in operation from November 1981 to September 
1983. Laid off workers from a Chrysler assembly plant and the 
Chrysler Foundry served as the comparison group in Phase II. 
Across both phases, program-eligible workers were experienced 
male production workers above the age of 25 who earned high wages 
averaging about $10.00 per hour on their pre-displacement jobs. 
BASF and DANA workers averaged nearly 15 years of tenure on 
their pre-displacement jobs, while average tenure for Ford MCC 
workers was about seven years. Most program-eligible workers were 
married with family responsibilities, and about 31 percent were 
black. It should be emphasized that workers were not randomly
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assigned to the treatment and comparison groups. Rather, treatment 
and comparison group members were randomly selected, respec 
tively, from the treatment and comparison plants.
Recruitment for the Downriver program was plant-based, with the 
cooperation of employers and the United Auto Workers union in pro 
viding rosters of laid-off workers, signing outreach letters, and post 
ing notices in union halls. Substantial rates of program participation 
of about 48 percent for Phase I and 42 percent for Phase II were 
achieved. These high participation rates appear to be attributable to 
the targeting of program services to workers laid off from particular 
plants, which defined a specific target population of workers and 
limited the number of employers and local unions that had to be con 
tacted for active involvement in outreach and recruitment efforts.
Eligible displaced workers who opted to participate in the Down 
river program were first enrolled in an orientation and testing 
program, followed by a mandatory four-day job-seeking skills work 
shop. After completing the workshop, participants who indicated an 
interest in retraining were evaluated by staff members before referral 
so that only those likely to benefit were sent on to training programs. 
Close to 60 percent of participants received some form of retraining 
with the bulk of these individuals enrolling in classroom training. 
Only about 13 percent of trainees were enrolled in on-the-job train 
ing, in part because OJT positions with local firms were difficult to 
secure. CT programs were contracted out to local educational insti 
tutions, usually under a performance-based contract. Under this con 
tracting scheme, reimbursement of training costs is based partly or 
entirely on contractor performance as measured by both the number 
of trainees completing the course and the number of trainees placed 
in jobs after training.
Table 3.2 indicates the three outcome measures used in the Down 
river program evaluation carried out by Abt Associates and reported 
by Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984). The placement rate mea 
sures the percentage of workers ever reemployed during the ob 
servation period measured from the date of layoff to the survey 
interview date. Observation periods for Downriver participants 
averaged about two-and-one-half years. To capture the stability of
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Table 3.2 
Net Impact Estimates for Major Displaced Worker Demonstrations8
Outcome measure
Demon 
stration 
project
Downriver13
Phase I:
BASF (1)
(2)
DANA (1)
(2)
Phase II:
Ford
MCC (1)
(2)
Buffalo
Target plant
Nontarget
plant
Texas WAD
Men:
Houston
El Paso
Women:
Houston
El Paso
New Jersey UI
Place 
ment 
rate
21.4%**
17.0**
18.8*
8.7*
-38.4**
-19.2*
31**
6
Employ 
ment0
20.1%**
18.4**
6.1*
5.8*
-9.4
-5.6
33**
11
2.1wks.
0.7
1.7
3.1**
Ave. 
earnings'1
$110.9**
44.4**
121.8*
33.1*
-2.3
-18.9
115**
96**
750
770
0
1,070**
Ave. 
wkly. UI Weeks 
hours benefits6 of UIf
13.6%**
7.6**
-$210
-170
200
-130
-108 -0.62
Sources: Downriver: Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984: tables 3.4 and 3.6); Buffalo: 
Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985: table IV.3); Texas WAD: Bloom and Kulik (1986: exhibit 
7.2); and New Jersey: Corson, et al. (1989: table 2).
d** and * signify that the program effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent and 10 
percent confidence levels, respectively.
bFor Phase I, (1) signifies that Lear-Siegler only is the comparison plant; while (2) signifies 
that Lear-Siegler and Chrysler Foundry are the comparison plants. For Phase II, (1) signifies 
that Chrysler Assembly only is the comparison plant; while (2) signifies that Chrysler Assem 
bly and Chrysler Foundry are the comparison plants.
cFor Downriver and Buffalo, measured as the percentage of weeks employed during the 
observation period; for Texas WAD, measured as number of weeks worked during post- 
assignment quarters 3 and 4. Quarterly employment rate estimates for New Jersey are reported 
in table 3.7.
dMeasured weekly for Downriver and Buffalo and annually for Texas WAD. Quarterly esti 
mates for New Jersey are reported in table 3.7.
eMeasured over 30 weeks for Texas WAD and over the benefit year for New Jersey. The New 
Jersey estimate is constructed as a weighted average of separate treatment effects.
Constructed as a weighted average of separate treatment effects.
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employment following layoff, the employment rate measures for 
each worker the fraction of weeks employed during the observation 
period. Finally, average weekly earnings are calculated as total earn 
ings from layoff to interview divided by the number of weeks in the 
observation period. A number of measured variables which differed 
between the program-eligible and comparison groups and which 
were thought to influence reemployment experience are controlled 
for using regression analysis. These control variables include worker 
characteristics such as age, race, marital status, schooling, work ex 
perience, and tenure and occupation in the pre-layoff job. Also in 
cluded is a dummy variable for each plant. No attempt was made to 
control for sample selectivity except for the inclusion in the regres 
sion models of explanatory variables likely to affect program partic 
ipation as well as labor market outcomes.
For Phase I of the program, the net impact estimates in table 3.2 
indicate that program enrollment increased both the placement rate 
and the employment rate of former BASF workers by about 20 per 
centage points. These findings are especially noteworthy because of 
their robustness across comparison groups. With respect to average 
weekly earnings, participants enjoyed an increase in earnings over 
the level they otherwise could have expected of $44 and $111, de 
pending on whether Chrysler Foundry is included in the comparison 
group. This sensitivity to the composition of the comparison group 
may reflect, in part, the fact that Chrysler workers were the highest 
paid and BASF workers the lowest paid prior to layoff of those sur 
veyed. The higher estimate implies an annual earnings gain on the 
order of $5,545 (assuming a 50-week work year), which is consid 
erably larger than any of the estimates shown in table 2.2 for CETA 
programs.
Among former DANA workers, the net impact estimates shown in 
the table for placement rates and especially for employment rates, 
while still positive, are smaller than those obtained for the BASF 
group. In addition, the DANA estimates for placement rates are 
much more sensitive to the composition of the comparison group. 
On the other hand, the estimated net impact of the program on earn 
ings is roughly the same for former DANA workers as for former
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BASF workers with the same degree of sensitivity to the composi 
tion of the comparison group.
Turning to Phase II, program participation is seen to have actually 
reduced the placement rate of former Ford workers during the post- 
layoff observation period. Participation also has a negative but not 
statistically significant effect on the employment rate and on weekly 
earnings. To reconcile this dramatic difference in estimates between 
the two phases, Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984: 74-82) con 
sider the effects of possible changes in program services and in the 
characteristics of eligible workers and of the worsening local labor 
market situation between 1980-81 and 1981-83. They conclude, 
however, that the most likely explanation lies in the existence of un 
measured plant-specific differences that were not completely con 
trolled for by the observable variables included in the regression 
models. Estimated net impacts may thus confound unmeasured plant- 
specific differences with the true program effects. In particular, im 
portant differences in motivation may have existed between DANA 
and BASF workers and Ford workers. Supporting this conclusion is 
quantitative evidence indicating a shorter length of program enroll 
ment and a lower rate of training completion for Ford workers. An 
ecdotal evidence also suggests greater problems of absenteeism and 
drug abuse in the Ford plant.
The Downriver program also sheds a limited amount of light on 
the four policy questions posed in chapter 1. Beginning with the is 
sue of the effectiveness of alternative program services, the only 
available comparison for the Downriver program involves CT and 
ISA. Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984: 82-92) report that av 
erage skill training cost per enrollee was more than twice the average 
cost of ISA and that the program significantly increased access to 
training programs. Nevertheless, training is found not to have signif 
icantly improved participants' reemployment prospects above the as 
sistance provided by ISA. The authors qualify this finding with the 
caveats that (1) the sample sizes are small and (2) workers were not 
randomly assigned to the CT and ISA-only treatment groups.
Concerning the next two questions, the Downriver program pro 
vides evidence regarding program participation in general rather
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than the receipt of skill training only. Question 2 asks whether some 
groups benefit more from training than others. The Downriver eval 
uation results indicate that tenure on the pre-layoff job, age, and a 
black skin color are negatively related to post-program employment 
and earnings. Total labor market experience, on the other hand, 
serves to enhance employment prospects. Question 3 poses the dis 
tinction between the effect of training on wage rates as opposed to 
reemployment. The results shown in table 3.2 for Phase I (but not, 
as noted, for Phase II) indicate that program participation decreases 
duration of unemployment and increases weekly earnings, with the 
impact on earnings for DANA workers being particularly large rela 
tive to the impact on unemployment. Without evidence on the effect 
of the program on weekly hours, however, it is not possible to cal 
culate its impact on average hourly wages.
Worth discussing in some detail is the approach of Downriver pro 
gram planners to the final question of what to train workers to do. 
Downriver staff members first attempted to identify occupations for 
which demand was expected to grow in the local labor market. This 
task was accomplished by reviewing economic forecasts and studies 
conducted by local universities, studying trade journals, and analyz 
ing labor market data collected by the Michigan Employment Secu 
rity (ES) commission. Next, the actual demand for labor in the 
occupations that survived this scrutiny was verified through inter 
views with local employers and representatives of trade associations. 
Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984: 30) emphasize, however, that
[P]rogram staff were not interested in identifying firm- 
specific labor needs for which "customized" training 
would need to be developed, as staff considered this a risky 
investment. Rather, they preferred to train for occupations 
for which there was sufficient demand on the part of a 
number of employers, so that participants' reemployment 
prospects were not tied to the fortunes of only one firm.
Once the decision on occupations was arrived upon, Downriver of 
ficials invited local educational institutions to participate in design 
ing curricula suitable for class-size training programs.
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The Dislocated Worker Demonstration Project
Responding to widespread layoffs and plant closings during the 
early 1980s, the USDOL launched the Dislocated Worker Demon 
stration Project in October 1982 with the objective of gaining a bet 
ter understanding of how best to reduce the adjustment costs borne 
by workers displaced from jobs in major manufacturing industries. 
While the Downriver program provided some guidance for develop 
ing new displaced worker program, USDOL officials took the posi 
tion that it was important to test additional program models in 
different economic environments. In addition, the Downriver net im 
pact estimates are difficult to interpret because of the striking differ 
ences between the two phases of the project and the sensitivity of 
even Phase I impact estimates to the choice of comparison plants. To 
provide firmer evidence on the effectiveness of retraining and other 
services in assisting displaced workers, demonstration grants were 
awarded to six sponsoring organizations scattered throughout the 
country. The sponsoring organizations were located in Alameda 
County, California; Buffalo; Milwaukee; Lehigh Valley, Pennsylva 
nia; Mid-Willamette Valley, Oregon; and Yakima County, Washing 
ton. Concurrently, a seventh project funded by state, local, and 
private-sector sources was implemented in the Southgate area of Los 
Angeles. The six projects plus the Southgate program served over 
10,000 displaced workers between October 1, 1982 and September 
30, 1983.
The Buffalo Dislocated Worker Program
Early in the evaluation design process, it was decided that due to 
cost considerations the impact analysis should be limited to one site 
only. The Buffalo program was chosen as the impact analysis site, 
primarily because it offered a true control group for the majority of 
the workers recruited for participation in the program. 2 It was also a 
relatively successful program among the six sites, as measured by 
short-term performance indicators such as the overall placement 
rate. Referring back to table 3.1, the Buffalo program is seen to be 
quite similar to Downriver in terms of the target population of
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displaced workers. In fact, Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985: 11) 
note that the Buffalo impact evaluation has the advantage that in 
some respects it can be viewed as a replication of the Downriver 
evaluation. On the other hand, the ability to generalize from the 
evaluation findings is limited by the decision to carry out the net 
impact analysis only for Buffalo.
Buffalo program services were offered to two groups of displaced 
workers (1) mostly steel and auto workers displaced during 1982 
from nine area plants, and (2) a more heterogeneous group of work 
ers permanently laid off after 1980 from over 300 area establish 
ments. About 30 percent of program slots were reserved for the latter 
group. The program used three different procedures for selecting 
workers for program participation. First, available program slots 
were rationed through a formal lottery mechanism among workers 
from six of the nine target plants. Thus, displaced workers in what is 
termed the "target-plant sample" who were offered program ser 
vices (or recruited) are a random sample of all workers from these 
six plants. Nonrecruited workers from these plants would represent a 
natural control group. Second, all workers from the three remaining 
target plants were recruited for the program. Finally, workers from 
the over-300 area establishments were offered program services on a 
first-come, first-served basis as program slots become available. Re 
cruited workers from the three remaining target plants and from the 
over-300 area establishments are termed the "nontarget-plant sam 
ple." For each of the two samples, labor market outcomes observed 
for program participants are compared to those observed for a com 
parison group consisting of (1) recruited individuals who chose not 
to participate when offered services, and (2) individuals who were 
not offered services.
Most of the personal and job-related characteristics of recruited 
workers in the target-plant and nontarget-plant samples are quite 
similar, with recruited workers being predominantly married white 
males between the ages of 25 and 55 working full time in blue-collar 
jobs prior to their displacement. In addition, recruited workers in 
both groups experienced lengthy periods of post-displacement unem 
ployment prior to program participation. On average, target-plant
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workers had been laid off more than a year before the start of the 
program, while those in the nontarget-plant sample had been laid off 
for about eight weeks. The other major difference between the two 
samples is that the pre-layoff hourly wage of recruited workers in the 
target-plant sample averaged $10.78, as opposed to an average pre- 
layoff wage of $8.70 for recruited nontarget-plant workers. Length of 
pre-layoff tenure was 10.1 years and 8.5 years, respectively, for re 
cruited target-plant and nontarget-plant workers.
Buffalo Program Evaluation Results
It was noted earlier in this chapter that the Downriver program 
achieved participation rates among recruited workers approaching 50 
percent. Complicating the evaluation of the Buffalo program carried 
out by Mathematica Policy Research are the much lower participa 
tion rates for workers offered program services in both samples (16 
percent among recruited target-plant workers and 28 percent among 
nontarget-plant workers who applied and were offered services). 
These low participation rates raise the possibility of selection bias 
due to nonrandom assignment or selection of displaced workers into 
the treatment and comparison groups. For the target-plant sample, 
selection bias arises because recruited workers who chose not to par 
ticipate in the program are included along with nonrecruited workers 
from the same target plants in the comparison group. In addition to 
this problem, the comparison group available for the nontarget-plant 
sample is further contaminated by the presence of eligible workers 
from the over-300 area enterprises who (1) chose not to apply for 
program services, or (2) applied for services but were not chosen by 
program staff members.
As described in the evaluation report by Corson, Long, and May- 
nard (1985: 100-104), the selection bias problem is dealt with by 
first explicitly modeling program participation. The parameter esti 
mates of the participation equation are then used to construct a se 
lectivity variable (i.e., the inverse Mill's ratio) which is included as 
a regressor in each post-program outcome equation. The program es 
timates shown in table 3.2 are calculated using this econometric ap 
proach to (hopefully) obtain program effects free of selection bias.
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All four outcome variables displayed in the table are measured for 
the first six post-program months.
Beginning with target-plant workers, the results in table 3.2 indi 
cate that program participation has a statistically significant effect 
on placement and employment rates as well as on weekly hours and 
earnings. These effects are quite large, exceeding in size the Down 
river Phase I results for the same outcome variables. Expressing the 
coefficient estimates as percentages of pre-program mean values, 
participation in the Buffalo project more than doubled the proportion 
of time spent employed and increased the placement rate by more 
than one-half. Increases in average weekly hours and average weekly 
earnings are 135 percent and 195 percent, respectively, suggesting 
that the program may have boosted hourly wages for those reem- 
ployed, at least in the short run. For the nontarget-plant sample, the 
point estimates obtained are uniformly smaller than for the target- 
plant sample; and the main program impacts appear to be increases 
in weekly hours and average earnings as opposed to improvements in 
employment opportunities.
Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985: 110-17) also report impact es 
timates broken down by program treatment and demographic sub 
groups. With respect to program treatments, the Buffalo site, as was 
the case for all six sites in the demonstration project, offered partic 
ipants a full range of services including ISA, CT, and OJT. Follow 
ing initial orientation and assessment sessions, all Buffalo 
participants were required to attend a four-day job search workshop. 
About 45 percent of program participants were then channeled into 
either CT or OJT positions. Area employers at each of the six sites 
were offered a 50 percent wage subsidy to develop OJT slots, and 
the Buffalo program provided the highest proportion of OJT posi 
tions among the six sites. The 55 percent of participants who did not 
receive CT or OJT were assigned to counselors/resource coordinators 
and offered job development and referral services. The Buffalo pro 
gram also maintained a resource .center to be used by workers in 
conducting their own job search.
For the employment rate and average weekly earnings, table 3.3 
presents net impact estimates disaggregated by program treatment.
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Table 3.3
Estimated Program Impacts for the Buffalo Dislocated Worker 
Project, by Principal Program Treatment
Outcome variable and 
principal program treatment
Employment rate:
CT
OJT
JSA-only
Average weekly earnings:
CT
OJT
JSA-only
Target-plant 
sample
47**
18
33**
$122
64
134**
Nontarget-plant 
sample
46**
13
-6
$141
136**
15
Source: Corson, Long and Maynard (1985: table IV.4).
Note: ** signifies that the program effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
confidence level.
Among target-plant workers, the results indicate that ISA and CT 
had large effects of roughly the same magnitude on both outcome 
measures. The strong results for CT, but not for ISA, also carried 
over to the nontarget-plant estimates. Drawing on the more reliable 
results for the target-plant sample, Corson, Long, and Maynard 
(1985: 111-13) point out that JSA is the more cost effective of the 
two treatments. The reason is that the additional effects (if any) of 
CT above those of JSA are not large enough to compensate for the 
higher cost of CT services. (Average costs per participants were 
$851 for ISA-only, $3,282 for CT with JSA, and $3,170 for OJT 
with JSA.) Note that the absence of an incremental effect of CT echos 
the similar finding obtained for the earlier Downriver program. Cor 
son, Long, and Maynard caution, however, that many CT participants 
completed their training near the end of the demonstration period 
and thus received relatively little placement assistance. Interestingly, 
OJT is seen not to have much of an impact on either the employment 
rate or average earnings for the target-plant sample; but it is statis 
tically significant in increasing average earnings for nontarget-plant 
workers. Since OJT was primarily used in the Buffalo program as a 
placement tool, the absence of an effect on employment opportuni 
ties suggests that the OJT treatment was unnecessary.
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Net program effects are also available broken down by sex, race, 
age, education, wages and tenure on the pre-displacement job, and 
availability of income support from Supplemental Unemployment 
Benefit (SUB) programs. Focusing on proportion of time employed 
for the target-plant sample, program impacts are found to be greater 
for women than men, for individuals under age 45 than for those 
older, and for workers with more than 10 years of tenure on their 
pre-layoff job than for those with less tenure. Time spent employed 
did not appear to be strongly affected by race, education, pre-layoff 
wages, and availability of SUB income support. The result for SUB 
support is important because it suggests, at least for Buffalo project 
participants, that the availability of income-maintenance support did 
not affect their response to program services.
Beyond the net impact results appearing in tables 3.2 and 3.3, 
Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985) present a comparison of the 
characteristics of the reemployment job with those of the pre-layoff 
job. This analysis shows that, on average, weekly hours were re 
duced from 5 to 10 percent, but that an even larger reduction oc 
curred in weekly earnings, particularly for the relatively high wage 
target-plant sample. For the target-plant group, about one-third had 
weekly earnings of less than 50 percent of their pre-layoff weekly 
earnings, while less than 20 percent showed an increase. Consider 
able occupational shifting also occurred, reflecting a substantial 
movement of workers to new jobs outside manufacturing, which had 
been the industrial sector in which a majority of the pre-layoff jobs 
were located.
One final note on the Buffalo project relates to the design of CT 
programs. Corson, Maynard, and Wichita (1984: 75-77) point out in 
their overview report on all six demonstration sites that the one-year 
duration of the project severely limited both the careful selection of 
high growth occupations and the necessary testing and assessment 
required to insure that participants possessed the motivation and nec 
essary academic skills to benefit from formal classroom training. In 
general, CT was limited to those occupations and training deliverers 
amenable to short-duration, high-intensity courses developed on 
short notice. Local employer involvement in the design of training
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programs typically took the form of recommendations of PIC com 
mittees based on ". . .a relatively unsystematic impression of labor- 
market demand" (Corson, Maynard, and Wichita 1984: 76).
The Texas Worker Adjustment 
Demonstration Projects
JTPA Title III funds began to flow to employment and training 
assistance programs for displaced workers in October 1982. To un 
derstand more completely the labor market effects of these pro 
grams, the Texas Department of Community Affairs designed and 
implemented the experimental Worker Adjustment Demonstration 
(WAD) projects operated at six sites between 1983 and 1985. Avail 
able for evaluation purposes are two projects in El Paso and one in 
Houston. In comparison to the Downriver and Buffalo projects, an 
important distinguishing feature of the WAD projects is that they 
represent an attempt to evaluate an ongoing displaced worker pro 
gram. In addition, as noted in table 3.1, WAD program services 
were provided to groups of displaced workers other than the mostly 
white male steel and auto workers who were targeted for assistance 
in the Downriver and Buffalo projects. Perhaps most important, the 
WAD projects applied a true experimental methodology including 
random assignment of eligible workers.
As described in the Abt Associates report by Bloom and Kulik 
(1986), the experimental design of the WAD projects allowed Title 
III program participants to be assigned randomly to either of two 
treatment groups or to a control group. The treatment groups were 
supplied services by Texas' established Title III service delivery sys 
tem. The first treatment group (called Tier I) received ISA services 
only. Core JSA services provided at all three sites included orienta 
tion, job search workshops, assessment, and job development and 
placement. Members of the second treatment group received JSA 
followed, if necessary, by more expensive classroom or on-the-job 
retraining (the Tier I/II sequence). The control group was not eligible 
for WAD services, but its members were informed of other non-Title 
III services available in their communities. One difference in the ex 
perimental design between the Buffalo program and the WAD
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projects should be emphasized. In the Buffalo target-plant sample, 
program slots were allocated randomly among eligible workers, but 
recruited workers made their own decision on whether to participate 
in the program and recruited nonparticipants are included in the 
comparison group. In the WAD projects, in contrast, eligible work 
ers were rationed randomly to the treatment and control groups so 
that recruited nonparticipants are not included in the control group.
It might also be noted that the low rate of participation for work 
ers offered program services that plagued the Buffalo program was 
not a problem for the WAD projects, with 71 percent of those as 
signed to the WAD treatment groups choosing to participate. Bloom 
and Kulik (1986: 29-31) mention, in particular, that shortfalls be 
tween the number of planned and actual participants occurred almost 
exclusively in connection with Tier II services; and these shortfalls 
were mainly the result of overestimating provider capacity rather 
than exaggerating workers' interest. In Houston, in addition, there 
was an important mismatch between the types of Tier II services 
supplied and the demand of the client population. This mismatch 
will be discussed at greater length later in this section.
Beyond the Tier I and Tier I/II distinction, there were also impor 
tant differences between the WAD sites in Houston and El Paso. In 
terms of workers' personal and job-related characteristics, over 80 
percent of those recruited and assigned to treatment and control 
groups in the Houston project were male and about 57 percent were 
white. Also represented in Houston were sizable groups of blacks and 
Asians. In the two El Paso sites, in contrast, approximately 90 percent 
of program eligibles were Hispanic and a majority were women. These 
differences by race and sex primarily reflect the industrial orienta 
tion of the projects, with the Houston program targeting its services 
to highly educated, largely white-collar professional workers laid off 
from petrochemical plants. In contrast, both El Paso programs fo 
cused on workers with much less education displaced from apparel, 
food processing, and other light manufacturing jobs. Mirroring this 
difference in industry orientation, the average hourly wage of Hous 
ton's eligibles was slightly over $13.00, as compared to about $5.00 
for eligible workers in El Paso. Rather surprisingly, most WAD eli-
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gibles in all three sites had been employed in their pre-layoff jobs for 
less than five years a considerably shorter period of time than the 
seven to fifteen years of pre-layoff tenure reported for Downriver and 
Buffalo displaced workers. It is perhaps worth noting that, since the 
benchmark analysis of displaced workers by Flaim and Sehgal 
(1985), three years of job tenure has commonly been used to distin 
guish the displaced from other unemployed workers.
One final difference between WAD sites is that only for the Houston 
site could the differential effect of the additional services in the Tier 
I/II sequence be distinguished from Tier I JSA-only services. The 
program outcome measures available for the El Paso sites are limited 
to a comparison of the Tier I/II sequence and the control group.
The WAD demonstration yielded three main results. As summa 
rized in table 3.2, the first is that program participants experienced 
short-run positive impacts on annual earnings and weeks worked, as 
well as a decrease in dollars received in UI benefits. (The ambiguous 
findings for female participants in the Houston site appear to be due 
to a small sample size.) More important, these impact estimates tend 
to be larger and more pronounced for women than for men. In par 
ticular, female participants in El Paso experienced a program- 
induced gain in annual earnings of $1,070. The gains in annual 
earnings for men in Houston and El Paso were only $750 and $770, 
respectively. Since the mostly white male Houston participants 
earned more than twice as much as the mostly Hispanic female El 
Paso participants prior to WAD enrollment, the gender difference in 
estimated earnings gains is even more striking when expressed per 
centage terms.
A second result emerges from quarter-by-quarter program impact 
estimates calculated by sex across all three sites and shown in table 
3.4. A large and statistically significant earnings gain of $500 oc 
curred for men in the second post-assignment quarter only, and the 
total net impact estimate for the year is not significantly different 
from zero due to its large standard error. The time pattern in these 
results indicates that the main effect of the program was to enable 
male participants to find jobs sooner than would have otherwise 
been the case. But ultimately, the employment opportunities of pro-
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Table 3.4
Estimated Program Impact on Quarterly 
Earnings for the Texas WAD Projects, by Sex
Earnings in post- 
assignment quarter
Quarter 1 
Quarter 2 
Quarter 3 
Quarter 4 
Total
Men
$110 
500** 
40 
130 
790
Women
$480** 
330** 
160 
-110 
890**
Source: Bloom and Kulik (1986: exhibit 7.1). 
Note: ** signifies that the program is statistically signifi 
cant at the 5 percent level.
gram participants were no better and the wages of participants no 
higher than for members of the control group. For women, similarly, 
WAD participation increased earnings on average by $480 in the 
first post-program quarter, followed by gradually decaying impacts 
for subsequent quarters. For the year as a whole, however, Bloom 
and Kulik report a statistically significant net impact estimate of 
$890, suggesting that female participants may have enjoyed a per 
manent gain from program participation. 3
The final result involves the differential effect of Tier I versus Tier 
I/II services for males in the Houston program. Average program 
costs per participant were $1,531 for Tier I and $4,991 for Tier I/II. 
Consistent with the results of the Downriver and Buffalo projects, 
skill training (which was almost exclusively classroom training) fails 
to increase earnings and employment above the effects of ISA-only 
services. In fact, taking at face value the net impact estimates shown 
in table 3.5, the differential impact of retraining is seen to be nega 
tive for annual earnings and weeks worked. The incremental effect of 
retraining services on total UI benefits is exactly zero.
Bloom and Kulik (1986: 170-73) take considerable care in inter 
preting these negative results for skill training. One explanation they 
offer is that the addition of a retraining program is likely to cause 
participants to delay undertaking serious job search until after the 
training period is completed. If, as just indicated, the primary pro 
gram effect for men is to expedite their reemployment and this effect
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Table 3.5
Net Impact Estimates for Men in the Houston WAD Project, 
____________by Program Treatment____________
Differential 
Outcome measure____Tier I-only Tierl/II impact
Earnings for the post- $860 $680 -$180 
assignment year
Weeks worked in post- 4.3** 0.6  3.7 
assignment quarters 
3 and 4
Total UI benefits for -$220 -$220 0 
the 30 week post-
assignment period__________________________ 
Source: Bloom and Kulik (1986: exhibit 7.3).
Note: ** signifies that the program effect is statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level.
occurs soon after the receipt of ISA services, a delay in beginning 
the job search process will reduce reemployment rates.
A second explanation considered more realistic by the authors is 
the mismatch between the retraining opportunities offered and the 
interests and backgrounds of the target group. The classroom train 
ing programs provided by the Houston Community College were 
primarily technical/vocational in nature, offering retraining in occu 
pations including air conditioning and refrigeration and computer 
maintenance technology. At the same time, as noted, Houston pro 
gram participants were well educated, highly paid former white- 
collar workers who presumably had little interest in training courses 
in skilled manual trades. Further complicating matters was a lack of 
integration of the ISA and CT program components caused by poor 
communication between the Tier I and Tier II contractors. It is there 
fore not surprising that the take-up of retraining was low and the 
payoff limited. In their recommendations for future Title III pro 
gramming, Bloom and Kulik (1986: 179-82) suggest that (1) ISA 
should be the core service provided in displaced worker programs, 
and (2) skill training should be offered to fewer, more carefully 
screened participants who can be better matched to training opportu-
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nities that are potentially available in the community. At the same 
time, however, they conclude that the cost effectiveness of high qual 
ity, accurately targeted skill training remains an open issue.
The New Jersey UI Reemployment 
Demonstration Project
Like the Texas WAD projects, the New Jersey Unemployment In 
surance (UI) Reemployment Demonstration was intended to examine 
the effectiveness of an ongoing program in this case, the operation 
of the UI system. The UI system provides short-term income support 
to involuntarily unemployed individuals while they actively seek 
work. It also attempts to assist in the reemployment of unemployed 
workers by referring them either to the ES for placement services or 
to retraining programs offered under JTPA. In recent years, however, 
a number of critics of the present UI system have argued that the 
primary reemployment problem encountered by workers displaced 
from their jobs by plant closures or mass layoffs is not one of riding 
out a temporary spell of unemployment until a cyclical upturn oc 
curs. Since the displaced face longer-term reemployment difficulties, 
these critics suggest instead that what is needed is the targeting of 
more intensive reemployment assistance, including skill training, to 
permanently separated UI claimants who would otherwise be unable 
to qualify for vacant jobs in growing industries.4 To increase their 
effectiveness, moreover, both critics and supporters of the present UI 
system agree that these reemployment services should be provided 
before or soon after layoffs take place (see Leigh 1989: chap. 4).
Initiated by the USDOL and operated as a joint venture by the 
USDOL and the New Jersey Department of Labor, the New Jersey 
Demonstration was implemented in July 1986 and program services 
were continued into the fall of 1987. In response to the recent criti 
cisms of the UI system, the project had two primary objectives. The 
first is to assess the feasibility of an "early intervention" strategy. 
At issue are the questions of whether and how it is possible to use 
the UI system to identify early in the claim period unemployed 
workers who are likely to face prolonged spells of unemployment 
and exhaust UI benefits. "Early" is defined operationally as the 
fifth week of claiming UI benefits.
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The Demonstration's second objective is to empirically measure 
the effectiveness of three alternative packages of reemployment ser 
vices in accelerating the return to work. The three packages of ser 
vices designated Treatments 1, 2, and 3, respectively are ISA- 
only, ISA combined with training or relocation assistance, and ISA 
combined with a cash bonus for early reemployment. Demonstration 
services were provided at each of 10 sites by four-person teams con 
sisting of three ES staff members and a JTPA staff member from the 
local Service Delivery Area operator. ES staff provided all of the 
services for the ISA-only and ISA plus reemployment bonus treat 
ments, and existing ITPA local program operators were responsible 
for identifying appropriate training opportunities and placing claim 
ants in training programs.
Program Design and Implementation
Beginning with the first objective, the basic problem is to distin 
guish displaced workers from those unemployed for cyclical, fric- 
tional, or seasonal reasons, so that "unneeded" services are not 
provided to workers reasonably anticipating recall to their old jobs 
or otherwise expected to have little difficulty in locating new 
employment. The clearest way to make this distinction is by looking 
at the length of completed unemployment spells. The longer the 
spell, the more likely it is that an unemployed worker is truly dis 
placed. Unfortunately, this approach is not of much help in making 
decisions early in the spell of unemployment on which workers 
should be targeted for assistance. Assistance might also be restricted 
to workers displaced from their jobs by a mass permanent layoff 
or a plant closure. This was the targeting strategy used in the Down 
river project described earlier. But this approach neglects the adjust 
ment assistance needs of job losers adversely affected by the ripple 
effect of a large plant closure or mass layoff in causing suppliers 
to the closed plant and local retail and service outlets to lay off 
employees.
The approach taken by New lersey program designers to distin 
guish the displaced from other unemployed workers was to apply 
five "screens" during the fourth week of claiming benefits. The cu 
mulative effect of these screens is to define the displaced to be UI
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claimants 25 years of age and older who had at least three years of 
tenure with their last employer prior to being laid off and who could 
not provide a specific date at which they expected to be recalled. As 
noted in table 3.1, slightly more than 11,000 claimants passed 
through these screens during the July 1986-June 1987 period and 
were randomly assigned to the three treatment groups and the control 
group. Men and women were about equally represented in the eligi 
ble population, and there were sizable proportions of blacks (17.2 
percent) and Hispanics (19.5 percent) as well as of workers age 55 
and older (22 percent). Regarding industry mix, about 47 percent of 
the eligible population was laid off from manufacturing jobs; 20 per 
cent and 16 percent, respectively, were displaced from jobs in whole 
sale and retail trade and services. The average pre-layoff wage for 
eligible workers was $403 per week, and about two-thirds of these 
workers were employed five years or longer on their pre-layoff jobs.
Turning to the second objective of the Demonstration, all three 
treatments began with a common set of initial services delivered, 
starting in the fifth week of unemployment. After receipt of a noti 
fication letter, claimants were to report to a Demonstration office 
(usually an ES office) for orientation and testing. In the following 
week, they attended a week-long, half-day job search workshop. 
This was followed a week later by a one-on-one counseling/assess 
ment session. These initial services were considered mandatory, and 
failure to report could lead to the denial of UI benefits.
Beginning with the counseling/assessment interview, the services 
offered to members of the three treatment groups diverged. Claim 
ants receiving Treatment 1 services the ISA-only group were ex 
pected to make periodic contact with the Demonstration office, 
either by stopping by to discuss job search activities with staff mem 
bers or by making use of the resource center situated in the office. 
Resource centers typically contained job listings, telephones, and oc 
cupational and training literature.
Claimants in the second treatment group were also informed about 
the resource center and the requirement to maintain periodic contact 
with the Demonstration office during the job search process. In ad 
dition, they were offered the opportunity to enroll in a CT or OJT
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program. Acceptable CT programs which were offered by a wide 
range of public and private training providers were subject to the 
restrictions that their expected duration not exceed six months and 
that remedial education be offered only if necessary to enable claim 
ants to progress to vocational training courses. The two major areas 
of CT were business and office and computer and information sci 
ences. Corson et al. (1989: 109, 111) note that the average cost per 
trainee of CT ($2,723) was low in comparison to the typical experi 
ence in New Jersey JTPA programs because the courses were de 
signed to upgrade claimants' skills rather than to provide training in 
a whole new vocational area. An example they cite of skill upgrad 
ing is that an individual with accounting skills might be trained to 
use a spreadsheet package on a personal computer.
Employers who provided OJT slots to claimants eligible for Treat 
ment 2 services received a wage subsidy of 50 percent; and about 
half of the OJT jobs were in technical, clerical, and sales occupa 
tions. Average cost of OJT per trainee was $1,960. Finally, Treat 
ment 2 claimants were told about the availability of relocation 
assistance which, if they elected not to pursue training, could be 
used to pay for moving expenses and for job interview trips exceed 
ing 50 miles in length. Consistent with the experience of earlier 
demonstrations, very few Treatment 2 claimants opted to take advan 
tage of relocation assistance.
The reemployment bonus concept made operational in Treatment 3 
is directed at the problem that the reemployment of displaced work 
ers may be delayed, not by inadequate job search skills, but by a 
lack of motivation to engage in search or by the natural reluctance to 
accept a new job offering considerably lower wages and benefits than 
the pre-layoff job. 5 The New Jersey reemployment bonus treatment 
worked as follows. During the counseling/assessment interview, 
claimants selected for this treatment were informed of the specifics 
of the bonus program. If they decided to participate, they could col 
lect the maximum bonus by locating and accepting a job during the 
next two weeks. The maximum bonus was specified to be one-half of 
the claimant's remaining UI entitlement at the time of the interview. 
(The maximum bonus averaged $1,644.) After the two-week period
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had passed, the size of the bonus decreased by 10 percent per week, 
reaching zero at the end of the eleventh week after the counseling/ 
assessment interview. A bonus payment was made only to partici 
pants who obtained full-time employment with a new employer 
lasting four weeks or longer. Furthermore, the payment of the bonus 
was tied to length of job tenure. At the end of four weeks of em 
ployment, the claimant received 60 percent of the bonus with the 
remaining 40 percent received only after 12 weeks of employment.
With the exception of the reemployment bonus and relocation as 
sistance, the Demonstration services were similar to existing JTPA 
retraining programs and ES placement assistance supplied to unem 
ployed New Jersey residents. An important difference is that claimants 
in the Demonstration had a considerably higher chance of receiving 
services. Moreover, Demonstration services were generally provided 
earlier in the unemployment spell than were existing services.
Evaluation Results
The evaluation of the New Jersey Demonstration was carried out 
by Mathematica Policy Research. Corson and Kerachsky (1987) dis 
cuss preliminary results for the first six months of program opera 
tion following its implementation in July 1986, and Corson et al. 
(1989) present final program evaluation results. Regarding the Dem 
onstration's first objective, Corson et al. suggest that the five 
screens used do satisfactorily identify claimants who, in the absence 
of additional employment services, would be likely to experience 
difficulty in becoming reemployed. Sizable fractions of the eligible 
population were older, previously employed in manufacturing, and 
displaced from their jobs by a plant closure or the elimination of a 
shift. Moreover, the eligible population includes a substantial propor 
tion of black and Hispanic workers. It is also important to note that 
the eligible population experienced longer UI durations and a higher 
UI exhaustion rate than the ineligible population. Cases in which the 
screening procedure tended to break down include individuals from 
growing industries like services, and claimants who eventually re 
turned to their former employer and presumably did not require pro 
gram services.
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With respect to the second objective, strengths of the New Jersey 
Demonstration are its broad coverage of state residents and its large 
sample size. As is true for the Buffalo demonstration project, how 
ever, the assessment of Treatment 2 services is made more difficult 
by a low degree of participation in retraining programs. Of those 
who passed through the counseling/assessment interview and were 
offered training, only about 15 percent chose to participate. Most of 
these participants were enrolled in a CT program. While this partic 
ipation rate is higher than the rate for noneligible claimants exposed 
to regular JTPA retraining services, it is not as high as might be 
expected on the basis of earlier demonstration projects. Corson et al. 
(1989: 113-15) speculate that this lower than expected participation 
rate may be because (1) the offer of retraining early in the layoff 
period comes before claimants recognize that they could benefit from 
training services; (2) program eligible claimants who agreed to as 
sessment and counseling sessions (and were offered training) as a 
requirement to collect UI would presumably be less interested in 
training programs than those who attended the initial sessions volun 
tarily, as was the case for some other demonstrations; and (3) inad 
equacies in the screening procedure mean that some individuals 
offered training simply did not need it.
Since Treatments 1 and 3, in particular, are intended to lead to 
more rapid reemployment of participating claimants, it is expected 
that the amount of UI benefits received by treatment group members 
will be less than the amount received by the control group. This 
expectation is borne out in the negative and statistically significant 
net impact estimates in table 3.6. Although random assignment as 
sures in principle that differences in mean outcomes for the treatment 
groups and the control group provide unbiased net impact estimates, 
the estimates reported are coefficients estimated from a simple re 
gression model containing dummy variables to represent the three 
treatments and controlling for differences in claimants' individual 
characteristics, ES offices, and the timing of sample selection.
Looking first at the ISA-only treatment in table 3.6, program par 
ticipation reduces UI benefits by $87 over the benefit year an esti 
mate that is considerably less than the -$200 calculated over 30
42 Evidence from U.S. Demonstration Projects
Table 3.6
Estimated Program Impacts on UI Receipt for the New Jersey 
UI Reemployment Demonstration, by Program Treatment
UI measure
Dollars paid in 
benefit year
Weeks paid in 
benefit year
Weeks paid in 
first spell
JSA plus JSA plus 
JSA-only training reemployment bonus
-87* -81*
-0.47* -0.48**
-0.59** -0.53**
  170***
 0.97***
-0.93**
Exhaustion rate -0.028** -0.017 -0.037***
Source: Corson et al. (1989: table 2).
Note: *, **, and *** signify that the program effect is statistically significant at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.
weeks for the Texas WAD projects. The $87 estimate represents 
about a 3 percent reduction in average benefits paid to the control 
group. ISA-only is further seen to decrease weeks of UI receipt dur 
ing the first UI spell and during the benefit year and to reduce the 
exhaustion rate of claimants. The slightly larger effect for weeks paid 
in the first spell than for weeks paid over the entire benefit year 
^suggests that a few individuals who stopped collecting UI because of 
ISA subsequently collected additional benefits later in their bene 
fit year.
Skipping over Treatment 2 for the moment, JSA plus the reem- 
ployment bonus is expected to have the largest impact of the three 
treatments because of the substantial reemployment incentive created 
by the bonus. The differences between Treatment 3 and Treatment 1 
estimates are significantly different from zero indicating a sizable 
incremental effect of the bonus in speeding up reemployment. Cor 
son et al. (1989: 266) suggest that the more appropriate comparison 
is between Treatment 1 and 3 claimants who received the counseling/ 
assessment interview. Focusing on these individuals, the reemploy 
ment bonus offer by itself reduced UI benefits by $101 over the 
benefit year and weeks paid in the benefit year by 0.69. These esti-
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mates are somewhat smaller than the impacts of UI receipt reduc 
tions of $158 in benefit payments and 1.15 weeks paid over the ben 
efit year estimated by Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) for the 
Illinois Claimant Bonus Experiment. 6
Treatment 2 is expected to have the smallest short-run effect on UI 
receipt of the three treatments since individuals undergoing training 
continued to receive UI benefits. Consistent with this expectation, 
the impact estimates presented in table 3.6 indicate that the offer of 
training assistance on top of the basic ISA services provided in 
Treatment 1 did not appreciably affect the UI outcomes examined. 
This result is understandable since the low take-up rate of the offer 
of training would dilute any program effect when measured over the 
entire treatment group.
Table 3.7 expands the net impact analysis to include estimates of 
the effects of the three program treatments on proportion of time 
employed, earnings, and the post-UI wage rate. Data on the first 
two of these outcome measures are obtained from a follow-up in 
terview that allows the measurement of quarter-by-quarter effects 
for the first four quarters following the claim filing date. State ad 
ministrative records, which do not lend themselves to measuring 
the timing of program impacts, are the source of the wage data. 
For Treatment 1, the first quarter impact of ISA is to raise the em 
ployment rate of program participants 2.3 percentage points above 
that of the control group. As indicated in the table, this estimate 
represents a 16.2 percent increase in employment relative to the con 
trol group mean. In subsequent quarters, the point estimates are 
higher, but they represent smaller percentages of control group 
means, and the percentage impact estimates decline over time. Sim 
ilarly, the quarterly earnings estimates show a large initial impact 
of 18.2 percent, which declines over time to essentially zero by quar 
ter 4. Taken in conjunction with the quarterly earnings estimates 
displayed in table 3.4 for the Texas WAD projects, this evidence 
appears to be quite clear in indicating that ISA is effective in en 
couraging rapid reemployment. Its relatively low cost, moreover, 
means that in the cost-benefit analysis performed by Corson et al.
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JSA comes the closest of the three treatments to paying for itself in 
terms of reduced UI outlays.
Turning to Treatment 2, the quarterly net impact estimates shown 
in table 3.7 for JSA plus training are uniformly smaller than those 
for JSA only (with the exception of earnings in quarter 4). This re 
sult is not unexpected since individuals enrolled in training would 
remain unemployed for the duration of their training program. 
Rather than a significant short-run effect, the benefits of retraining 
are expected to show up in the longer run as upgraded skills pay off 
in increased employment stability and possibly higher wages. In an 
attempt to measure the longer-run impact of training, earnings im 
pacts in quarters 5 and 6 were estimated with the result that Treat 
ment 2 had no discernable effect in either quarter. (The point 
estimates are $2 in quarter 5 and -$124 in quarter 6, and neither 
estimate is statistically significant.) Before interpreting these results 
as further evidence of the ineffectiveness of skill training, however, 
Corson et al (1989: 14) caution that
. . . since relatively few individuals in the JSA plus training 
treatment actually received training, and since sufficient 
time had not elapsed to observe post-training employment 
outcomes for all these individuals, these findings should 
be considered inconclusive as they pertain to the value of 
training per se for the demonstration-eligible population.
The Treatment 3 results presented in table 3.7 indicate for the first 
two quarters that JSA plus the offer of a reemployment bonus has a 
larger impact on employment and earnings than JSA-only. These dif 
ferences between treatment impacts, however, are not as large as 
might be expected on the basis of the results in table 3.6 for UI 
receipt. By quarter 3, the effects of Treatment 3 on employment and 
earnings are seen to have declined sharply; and the quarter 3 and 
quarter 4 estimates are exceeded by the corresponding JSA-only es 
timates. It seems reasonable to conclude that the impact of Treatment 
3 on employment and earnings primarily represents the early reem 
ployment generated by JSA.
An important concern, especially with respect to the reemploy 
ment bonus, is that the effect of the treatments in accelerating reem-
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Table 3.7
Estimated Program Impacts on Employment, Earnings, and Post-UI
Wages for the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration,
by Program Treatment
Outcome 
measure
Employment rate:
Quarter 1
Quarter 2
Quarter 3
Quarter 4
Earnings:
Quarter 1
Quarter 2
Quarter 3
Quarter 4
% change in post-UI
wage relative to
pre-UI wage
JSA-only
2.3**
(16.2)
4 2***
(12.4)
4 3**
(7.7)
2.8
(4.5)
$125**
(18.2)
263**
(13.5)
171
(6.3)
49
(1.6)
0.041**
JSA plus JSA plus 
training reemployment bonus
1 9**
(13.4)
2.8*
(7.0)
2.2
(3.9)
1.7
(2.7)
$82
(11-9)
103
(5.3)
83
(3.1)
77
(2.6)
0.030**
2 §***
(19.7)
5.0***
(12.6)
2.3
(4.1)
0.6
(1.0)
$160***
(23.3)
278***
(14.3)
131
(4.9)
22
(0.7)
0.041**
Source: Corson et al. (1989: tables VI.2-VI.7 and VI. 11).
Notes: Quarters are defined relative to the date of the initial UI claim, and numbers in 
parentheses are impact estimates expressed as percentages of control group means. *, **, and 
*** signify that the program effect is statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.
ployment may have occurred because participants accepted a less fa 
vorable job match (thereby sacrificing earnings). The hourly wage 
results shown in the last row of table 3.7 suggest that this concern is 
groundless. In fact, all three treatments appear to have led to a mod 
est increase in the wages paid in post-UI jobs. Woodbury and 
Spiegelman (1987) report a similar finding for the Illinois Claimant 
Bonus Experiment. Their conclusion is that the faster reemployment
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of Illinois program participants resulted from more intense job 
search effort, and not from overly rapid acceptance of job offers.
In addition to the results described in tables 3.6 and 3.7, Corson 
et al. provide an analysis of the impact of the treatments disaggre 
gated by population subgroups. This analysis suggests that the treat 
ments were most successful at promoting the reemployment of 
displaced workers possessing marketable skills, such as clerical and 
other white-collar workers. The treatments were less successful in 
assisting those workers the authors describe as facing "hard-core, 
structural unemployment problems." The latter group includes blue- 
collar workers, workers displaced from jobs in durable-goods manu 
facturing, and permanently separated workers. One reason for the 
relatively favorable reemployment prospects of white-collar workers 
is found in recent evidence indicating that there is a high degree of 
transferability of skills for this group. Using 1984 DWS data for 
men, Kletzer (1989) shows that there is an important difference be 
tween blue-collar workers and managerial, professional, and techni 
cal workers in the contribution of pre-displacement job tenure to 
explaining post-displacement weekly earnings. To bring out this 
point, she calculates the following earnings elasticities with respect 
to tenure on the old and new jobs:
Blue-collar White-collar
Old job .02673 .03224 
New job .00691 .02613
These estimates suggest that the marginal contribution of previous 
job tenure to post-displacement earnings is just 25.8 percent of its 
contribution to pre-displacement earnings for blue-collar workers 
(.258 = .00691/.02673). For white-collar workers, on the other 
hand, this percentage rises to 81.0 percent. In other words, the skills 
possessed by blue-collar workers are more likely to be job-specific 
and thus nontransferable to the post-displacement job than those pos 
sessed by white-collar workers.
The conclusion that New Jersey Demonstration services were pri 
marily of assistance to displaced workers who already enjoyed rela-
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tively favorable reemployment prospects is not terribly surprising in 
view of the fact, noted earlier, that CT was designed to upgrade ex 
isting skills rather than to develop entirely new skills. Despite the 
absence of a measurable short-run effect of skill training, Corson et 
al. (1989: 342) therefore argue that longer-run, more intensive ser 
vices are needed for displaced workers who face major structural dis 
locations. In support of this argument, they cite the high rate at 
which otherwise eligible workers were excused from testing and job 
search workshops as evidence suggesting that referrals to English- 
as-a-Second-Language or remedial education services may be needed 
for some displaced individuals.
Summary
The four demonstration projects discussed in this chapter have the 
common purpose of quantitatively assessing the labor market effec 
tiveness for displaced workers of retraining programs. These pro 
grams include different mixes of three reemployment services ISA, 
CT, and OJT. Although they have a common objective, the projects 
differ considerably in terms of geographic location, experimental de 
sign, and the target populations of displaced workers served. This 
summary section attempts to pull together the plethora of net impact 
estimates reported for the different demonstrations by asking what 
light the results can shed on the four policy questions posed in chap 
ter 1.
Beginning with the issue of whether some types of training work 
better than others, the Buffalo, Texas WAD, and New Jersey projects 
are unanimous in indicating that ISA services have the intended ef 
fect on a variety of labor market outcomes. These include earnings, 
placement and employment rates, and amount of UI benefits. Given 
the relatively low cost per worker of ISA, this evidence suggests 
also that ISA services are cost effective.
For the other reemployment services, evidence gathered for all 
four demonstrations indicates that CT fails to have a sizable incre 
mental effect on earnings, employment, and UI benefits above that 
of ISA-only. It certainly does not appear to be the case that the ad 
ditional effect of CT is large enough to compensate for the higher
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cost of CT services. The authors of the major evaluation reports of 
fer a number of caveats for their findings including the difficulty of 
drawing reliable inferences from small sample sizes, the problem 
that program participants undergoing skill training have relatively 
little time left to receive placement assistance (given demonstration 
periods of fixed length), the scarcity of training providers capable of 
putting together high-quality, short-duration training courses on 
short notice, and the possibility that the classroom training provided 
is either not saleable in the local labor market or not of particular 
interest to the client population.
Regarding on-the-job training, the Buffalo project is probably the 
only one of the four demonstrations with enough participants placed in 
OJT slots to provide reasonably reliable estimates of the net impact 
of OJT programs. Contrary to the CETA results discussed in chapter 
2, OJT is not found to consistently have a positive effect on earnings 
for Buffalo trainees. Nor does it have much of an effect on employ 
ment rates. Since OJT was primarily used in the Buffalo program as 
a placement tool, it appears that this service was unnecessary.
The next question asked whether some groups of displaced work 
ers benefitted more from program services than others. Probably the 
strongest evidence relating to differences in program effects by race 
or ethnicity and sex is found in the results obtained for the Texas 
WAD projects. In terms of earnings and employment, female partic 
ipants in the two El Paso projects are found to enjoy much larger net 
impact estimates than males in the El Paso and Houston projects. 
The gender differences between program sites are even more impres 
sive when it is recognized that a majority of male Houston partici 
pants are white, whereas female El Paso participants are largely 
Hispanic. Reinforcing the WAD results is evidence from the Buffalo 
project indicating larger effects for women than men. The Buffalo 
project also suggests that little difference in net impact estimates ex 
ists for blacks and whites, but that workers under age 45 benefit 
more from program services than do older workers.
Rather than race/ethnicity and sex differences, the results of the 
New Jersey Demonstration emphasize the distinction between work 
ers with marketable skills and workers facing long-term, structural
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reemployment problems. In New Jersey, clerical and other white- 
collar workers are examples of the former group, while blue-collar 
workers laid off from durable goods manufacturing jobs typify the 
latter. In view of the Demonstration's objective of encouraging rapid 
reemployment through the UI system, it is not surprising that pro 
gram services primarily assisted workers with marketable skills.
The third question posed in chapter 1 raises the issue of whether 
training, to the extent that it improves reemployment prospects at all, 
works by increasing post-training wages or by speeding up the reem 
ployment process. For all program services combined, the Buffalo 
project permits the calculation of short-run program effects on 
weekly hours and average weekly earnings. The larger percentage 
effect on average weekly earnings than on weekly hours suggests 
that the Buffalo program boosted hourly wages for those reemployed 
during the first six post-program months. For all three of its program 
treatments, evidence from the New Jersey Demonstration also indi 
cates that program participation has a small positive impact on 
wages for reemployed claimants.
In contrast, the more detailed quarter-by-quarter program impact 
estimates calculated for the Texas WAD projects and the New Jersey 
Demonstration raise questions about whether this short-run positive 
effect on wage rates persists over time. For both men and women, 
the time pattern of the WAD results shows that the program in 
creased quarterly earnings in the first and second quarters, followed 
by gradually decaying impacts for subsequent quarters. Similar re 
sults broken down by program treatment are obtained for both em 
ployment and earnings in the New Jersey Demonstration. Thus, 
while the reemployment process was accelerated by program ser 
vices in both cases, participants' employment opportunities appear 
ultimately to be no better and their wages no higher than those of the 
members of the control group. There is no evidence, in other words, 
from either the WAD projects or the New Jersey Demonstration that 
program services permanently increased labor productivity.
The final issue raised in chapter 1 is what should workers be 
trained to do? A valuable contribution of the demonstration projects 
discussed in this chapter is to make apparent the difficulty in a short-
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duration demonstration of developing solid training curricula that 
meet the market test of providing saleable skills. Of the four demon 
strations, Downriver program planners probably paid the most atten 
tion to the problem of providing retraining in occupations expected 
to be in high demand. Yet, the skill training programs provided to 
Downriver trainees are not found to have a significant incremental 
effect in improving reemployment prospects above those for ISA- 
only recipients. The WAD projects also emphasize that one reason 
for low program take-up rates and modest net impact estimates is 
that CT curricula may not match the backgrounds and perceived 
needs of client workers.
NOTES
1. The other two major titles are Title II, which provides training to disadvantaged youth and 
adults and summer jobs to disadvantaged youth, and Title IV, which authorizes training pro 
grams directly administered by the USDOL for native Americans, seasonal and migrant work 
ers, and veterans.
2. Services were delivered at all six sites, however, and a detailed description of program 
design and implementation issues for the entire demonstration is found in Corson, Maynard, 
and Wichita (1984).
3. Bloom and Kulik (1986: 178-79) note also that, with the exception of women in Houston, 
control group members were able to locate new jobs paying nearly as much as they earned in 
their pre-layoff jobs. Thus, it is not surprising that the main effect of the WAD program was 
expediting the reemployment of participants at wages comparable to what they previously 
earned. The authors go on to suggest that with its client population of workers who appeared 
to be experiencing only short-run unemployment problems, there is some question whether the 
WAD demonstration captured the labor market circumstances faced by truly displaced workers.
4. As will be discussed in chapter 5, the Canadian federal government recently announced a 
policy change that specifies a more active role in the reemployment process for the UI pro 
gram in that country. As of 1990, Canada's Labour Force Development Strategy requires that 
10 percent of total UI expenditures must be spent on programs to upgrade the skills of unem 
ployed workers, as well as on maternity, child care, and older worker programs.
5. The initial test of the reemployment bonus concept in this country took the form of two 
controlled experiments carried out in Illinois between mid-1984 and mid-1985. In the Claimant 
Bonus Experiment, a random sample of new UI claimants was told that they would receive a 
cash bonus of $500 upon reemployment. In the Employer Bonus Experiment, another random 
sample of new UI claimants was instructed that, once a hiring commitment was made, the 
employer of each newly hired claimant would be eligible for a $500 cash bonus. In contrast to 
the generally statistically insignificant Employer Experiment results, Woodbury and Spiegel- 
man (1987) find that, on average, the claimant bonus reduced UI benefits by $158 and duration 
of insured unemployment by 1.15 weeks, where both outcome variables are measured over the 
benefit year.
6. Corson et al. (1989: 266, fn. 10) discuss the differences between the Illinois and the New 
Jersey reemployment bonus experiments that make this comparison not quite appropriate.
4 
State Retraining Programs
Beginning with MDTA in 1962 and continuing through the Eco 
nomic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) 
passed in 1988, chapters 2 and 3 briefly described the evolution of 
federal programs developed to supply displaced workers with adjust 
ment assistance services. For most of the 1980s, however, the Re 
agan administration's philosophy of new federalism made the states 
the key intergovernmental player in developing social policy initia 
tives including the establishment of new employment and training 
programs. In a recent survey of state training programs, Stevens 
(1986) points out that only six states do not commit funds to subsi 
dize programs that offer either classroom or on-the-job training.
Before looking at the details of particular state programs, it is 
useful to draw attention to two important features that distinguish 
state-funded initiatives in general from those provided by the federal 
government. l First, while only unemployed workers are currently el 
igible for Title III JTPA services, state programs are typically of 
fered in addition to employed workers at risk of being permanently 
laid off if their skills are not upgraded. Second, many states have 
addressed the critical issue of what to retrain displaced workers to do 
by tailoring training programs to meet the needs of individual em 
ployers. This means that state programs have the economic develop 
ment objective of creating new jobs, in addition to the traditional 
view of retraining as a human capital investment intended to raise 
the level of workers' skills to enable them to qualify for existing 
jobs. Federal programs, in contrast, generally are designed to qualify 
program graduates for jobs, in what are anticipated to be high- 
demand occupations. In the case of the federally funded Downriver 
demonstration project, for example, chapter 3 pointed out that pro 
gram planners made the explicit decision not to tailor training pro 
grams to meet firm-specific labor demands.
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Table 4.1
Major Features of California's ETP and Minnesota's MEED 
Programs and the Dayton Experiment
Program
California's
ETP
Minnesota's
MEED
Targeted 
workers
UI recipients, recent
UI exhaustees, and
employed workers at
risk of layoff
Unemployed work 
ers not eligible for
UI or workers' com 
pensation. Priority
given to General
Assistance and
AFDC eligibles.
Services 
provided
Payment to providers
of CT and OJT to
cover direct program
costs. Training provid 
ers may be either the
employer requesting
the project or a train 
ing institution.
Subsidies of up to $4
per hour in wages and
up to $1 per hour in
fringes paid to small
employers
Funding 
mechanism
Diversion of UI
tax revenues
General state
tax revenues
Dayton 
experiment
AFDC and General 
Assistance recipients
Wage vouchers paid to 
employers in the form 
of either a tax credit 
or a direct cash pay 
ment. Vouchers equal 
to 50% of first-year 
earnings and 25% of 
second-year earnings.
Federally 
funded
The first state initiative considered in this chapter California's 
Employment Training Panel (ETP) is the largest and undoubtedly 
the best known of ongoing state training programs. In addition, ETP 
is among the few state programs for which quantitative evaluation 
evidence is available. The Minnesota Employment and Economic 
Development (MEED) program is examined next as an example of 
the wage-subsidy approach to training and economic development. 
Presented in connection with the MEED program is quantitative 
evidence obtained for the federally funded Dayton targeted wage- 
subsidy experiment. Table 4.1 highlights some of the major differ 
ences between these three programs with respect to targeted 
workers, the services provided, and funding mechanisms.
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California's ETP
Major Program Features
Begun in January 1983, ETP receives state funding of $55 million 
per year to be used for retraining current UI recipients, recent UI 
exhaustees, and workers currently employed (and covered by the UI 
system) but in danger of being laid off due to changes in technology 
or other changes in the workplace. Individual training projects eligi 
ble for ETP funding must provide at least 100 hours of instruction 
consisting of either CT or OJT. Projects are initially funded for up to 
18 months, with possible contract extensions for as long as two 
years. Since its inception, the Panel has taken pride in noting that its 
staff, not the employer, does the paperwork; and that when speed is 
important the project outline and a formal agreement can be ap 
proved in a time period as short as one month.
The Panel deals with the question of what to train workers to do 
by making the program almost entirely employer-driven. Employers 
initiate the process by proposing individual projects to the Panel. If a 
project is approved and a contract negotiated, the employer selects 
trainees according to its own specifications, sets standards for suc 
cessful program completion, and approves the training curriculum if 
an outside training provider (e.g., a state post-secondary educational 
institution) is selected. The Panel reimburses employers or other 
training providers on a fixed-fee basis for the training costs incurred. 
ETP funds may not be spent to subsidize the wages paid to trainees 
or to pay income-maintenance allowances. Nor does ETP, as is typi 
cal of state training programs, provide support for remedial educa 
tion. In return for the training subsidy and the discretion given them 
in all aspects of the retraining process, participating employers must 
make a good-faith commitment to hire or retain program graduates. 
Largely bypassed, therefore, is the problem that workers are trained 
in skills that are no longer demanded by employers.
Two unique features of ETP are its funding mechanism and its 
extensive use of performance-based contracting. With respect to 
funding, state retraining programs are typically financed by general 
state tax revenues. A widely discussed policy issue is whether fi 
nancing options for displaced worker programs should be expanded
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to include the use of state UI trust funds (see, for example, Kuttner 
1985). Federal law currently restricts the use of UI trust funds to 
financing income-maintenance benefits. As noted in connection with 
the New Jersey Demonstration in chapter 3, critics of the present UI 
system argue that to facilitate the reemployment of displaced work 
ers, the use of UI trust funds should be expanded to finance retrain 
ing and other forms of adjustment assistance. In California, ETP is 
linked to the state's UI trust fund by the statutory requirement that 
the program is to operate so as to reduce UI expenditures by speed 
ing up claimants' reemployment. To avoid the federal prohibition on 
financing retraining programs with UI trust funds, a novel strategy 
adopted by the California legislature was to create a separate Em 
ployment Training Fund financed by a 0.1 percent payroll tax as 
sessed on all employers with a positive reserve in their UI account. 
At the same time, state employers had their regular UI tax rates re 
duced by 0.1 percent. The funding of ETP can thus be viewed as a 
diversion of a small part of regular UI tax revenues to finance train 
ing and economic development. California was in a favorable posi 
tion to carry out this diversion because of a surplus in its UI trust 
fund. Since 1983, two states Delaware and Washington have fol 
lowed California's example in diverting regular UI contributions to 
separate training and economic development funds financed by an 
employer payroll tax.
Turning to its contracting mechanism, ETP's enabling legislation 
requires that all contracts between the Panel and employers or train 
ing agencies be performance-based. Performance is defined strin 
gently to mean that the negotiated payment per worker is withheld 
until trainees have completed their retraining programs, are placed in 
training-related jobs at wage rates stipulated in the contract, and are 
retained in those jobs for at least 90 days. Moreover, the jobs for 
which workers are trained must be good jobs in the sense that they 
offer long-term employment security and career potential and pro 
vide wages that are customary for the occupation and industry in the 
local labor market in which employment is to occur. Thus Panel 
funds are not spent until trainees have completed their training and 
are satisfactorily placed.
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Table 4.2 
Summary Statistics for the ETP Program, June 30, 1988
Clients served 
by the project
Unemployed 
only 
Potentially dis 
placed only 
Both groups
Ave. 
cost/ 
trainee
$3,135 
2,196
2,273
Post- 
training 
wage
$6.68 
9.42 
7.57
Ave. 
hours of 
training3
503
234 
333
% of 
planned expenditures
1985
52 
31 
17
1988
24 
63 
13
Sources: ETP (1985: table 4), ETP (1987: table III-D), and ETP (1988: table III-D). 
"Data for June 30, 1987.
Evaluation Evidence
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for successful program grad 
uates as reported in the most recent ETP annual report (1988) to the 
legislature. As might be expected, upgrading the skills of current 
employees potentially at risk of displacement is considerably cheaper 
than retraining the unemployed. The average number of hours of 
training for employed trainees is less than half that for unemployed 
trainees, while the average post-training wage for employed trainees 
is nearly $3.00 per hour higher than for the unemployed. It is also 
interesting to note that as of 1988, 63 percent of ETP expenditures is 
directed toward potentially displaced workers only, and another 13 
percent of expenditures includes the potentially displaced as well as 
actual unemployed workers. This is in contrast to earlier years, such 
as 1985, in which over 50 percent of ETP expenditures went to 
projects designed for the unemployed.
Estimates of the impact of ETP on participants' earnings are re 
ported in a recent evaluation study carried out by the Training Re 
search Corporation of Santa Monica, California (see Moore, Wilms, 
and Bolus 1988). Analyzed are the records of about 3,900 individu 
als enrolled in ETP training programs between 1983 and 1985. 
About 60 percent of the trainees examined were unemployed and 
seeking new jobs, while the other 40 percent had enrolled in retrain 
ing to avoid layoffs. As shown in table 4.3, sampled participants are 
further stratified by whether they completed their training program
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Table 4.3 
Estimated Net Impact of the ETP Program on Annual Earnings
Initial employment 
status and program 
completion status
Pre- Post- Difference Regression
pro- pro- (% change) coef. (stand.
gram gram error)
Unemployed: 
Completed, 
90 days (N
employed
= 234)
Dropped out (N = 125)
Completed, 
90 days (N
Employed: 
Completed, 
90 days (N
not employed 
= 96)
employed 
= 1,008)
Dropped out (N = 440)
Completed, 
90 days (N
not employed 
= 123)
$9,628
9,017
10,538
21,408
16,354
14,108
$16,912
9,882
12,352
27,147
19,106
20,466
$7,284 
(76)
865 
(10)
1,814 
(17)
5,739 
(27)
2,752 
(17)
6,358 
(45)
$3,745 
(691)
-1,351 
(684)
+
1,664 
(1,136)
-867 
(1,178)
+
Source: Moore, Wilms, and Bolus (1988: tables 9, 10, and 18).
Notes: Average annual earnings are shown in the first two columns + indicates the refer 
ence group. .
and, if they had completed training, whether they stayed on the job 
for 90 days. For the sample as a whole, participants were predomi 
nantly male heads of households between the ages of 25 and 45. 
Exactly one-half were white, with Hispanics representing another 25 
percent and blacks 12 percent.
In the absence of a comparison or control group of nonpartici- 
pants, the Training Research Corporation evaluation relies mainly on 
a pre-program/post-program comparison of labor market outcomes 
supplemented by comparable information on program dropouts. As 
discussed in chapter 2, a fundamental problem with this evaluation 
approach is that the program effect will be overstated if the typical 
pre-program dip in earnings is the result of some transitory labor
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market phenomenon. Looking first at participants who were initially 
unemployed, table 4.3 presents evidence of a rebound in average an 
nual earnings for program dropouts; but the magnitude of the re 
bound ($865 or 10 percent) is dwarfed by the 76 percent increase in 
earnings enjoyed by program completers who stayed on the job for 
90 days. Of course, this comparison is marred by the self selection 
inherent in the unobserved process that somehow leads some partic 
ipants to complete the program while others drop out. Holding con 
stant a number of personal and program characteristics and previous 
earnings, the regression results appearing in the last column show 
that, relative to program completers who did not stay on the job for 
90 days, completers who were retained enjoyed a statistically signif 
icant increase in earnings of $3,745. On the other hand, dropping 
out had a significantly negative earnings impact. Accepting these es 
timates at face value, the estimated difference in earnings between 
completing training and dropping out is thus $5,096 per year, or 53 
percent expressed as a percentage of average pre-program earnings. 
For employed program participants, the very fact that individuals 
were working rather than unemployed prior to entering the program 
means that (1) there should be less of a upward bias due to a tran 
sitory pre-program dip in earnings, and (2) any observed pre 
program/post-program earnings growth should capture to a greater 
extent higher wages as opposed to more stable employment. 2 Re 
flecting these considerations, the percentage growth in earnings is 
seen in table 4.3 to be much smaller for initially employed program 
completers (27 percent) than for initially unemployed completers (76 
percent). Among the initially employed, nevertheless, earnings 
growth for completers exceeds that for dropouts by 10 percentage 
points. A rather surprising result is the 45 percent earnings growth 
experienced by the relatively small number of program completers 
who did not stay on the job for 90 days. Given their low average 
pre-program earnings of just $14,108, it is quite possible that these 
individuals went through the training program and then moved on to 
better paying jobs with other employers. The regression results for 
the initially employed again indicate sizable positive and negative 
effects, respectively, of program completion and dropping out. In
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both cases, however, the estimates are accompanied by very large 
standard errors indicating a wide range of possible effects among 
individuals.
Criticisms of ETP
The two principal concerns that have been raised about the ETP 
program relate to the selection of participants and the use of public 
funds to subsidize training costs employers might otherwise have 
borne. There is no question that adherence to a performance-based 
system for compensating training providers increases the probability 
that the displaced workers most likely to be selected into the pro 
gram will be those least in need of skill enhancement. This problem 
is commonly known as "creaming." One piece of evidence suggest 
ing that creaming does in fact occur is the Panel's own finding noted 
in its 1988 annual report that only 8 percent of Panel trainees had 
failed to complete at least 12 years of schooling (see ETP 1988: ta 
ble III-F). The same statistic for the state's labor force is 27 percent. 
However, the report also points out that 53 percent of trainees are 
women compared to a workforce that is 43 percent female. Blacks 
and Hispanics are approximately proportionately represented among 
ETP trainees.
Moreover, as pointed out in table 4.2, ETP increasingly appears to 
be subsidizing the training by firms of their current workforces as 
opposed to supplying training to unemployed workers. One reason, 
as noted in the study by the Panel of Technology and Employment of 
the National Academy of Sciences (see Cyert and Mowery 1987: 
152), is that the requirement that trainees be placed in jobs for 90 
days prior to reimbursement discourages many potential external 
training providers such as community colleges from participating in 
the program. A consequence of the increased retraining of the em 
ployed is that ETP may be substituting public funds for the training 
investments employers would have made themselves in the program's 
absence. In this situation, there would be no net increase in the de 
livery of training services to workers threatened with displacement. 
On the assumption that large firms are better able to fund retraining
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than small firms, the following evidence taken from ETP's 1987 an 
nual report on the size distribution of employers of program gradu 
ates is instructive (see ETP 1987: table II-A):
Total state 
Firm size Panel trainees employment
0-49 18% 32%
50-99 6 11
100-249 10 15
250-499 14 10
500-1000 6 9
1000+ 46 23
Firm size in this table is measured by number of employees. It is 
clear that ETP trainees are underrepresented in the workforces of 
small employers and overrepresented in the workforces of quite large 
employers.
In defense of the Panel, two points should be brought out. First, 
the year 1987 marked an important transition for ETP in that, for the 
first time, employers' demand for training assistance exceeded the 
supply of available funds, forcing the rationing of funds among pro 
spective contractors. This excess-demand situation has led the Panel 
to impose certain priorities on its basic operating philosophy of re 
sponding to the market demand for training. More specifically, the 
list of new Panel priorities includes expedited consideration given to 
proposals in which special employment opportunities are offered to 
minorities, women, the disabled, and veterans and to proposals 
which promise assistance to persons already laid off or in danger of 
layoff due to plant closures or permanent mass layoffs. In addition, 
the Panel has committed itself to targeting approximately 30 percent 
of its funds for projects retraining the unemployed; and it is conduct 
ing a special marketing outreach to small businesses and minority- 
and female-owned enterprises.
Second and more fundamentally, ETP should be properly viewed 
as an economic development program to assist both employers and
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workers, as opposed to strictly a jobs program to assist disadvan- 
taged workers. In this context, a major goal of the program is to 
provide employers with an incentive to modernize plants and avoid 
layoffs by subsidizing the costs of retraining existing employees. 
Moreover, subsidies to large employers can be rationalized on the 
grounds that these firms provide jobs that pay high wages and offer 
career potential that is, the kinds of jobs that are mandated by 
ETP's enabling legislation. From a political perspective, finally, 
since employers of all sizes are contributing financially to ETP, the 
assistance to large employers is important in maintaining overall 
business support for the program.
Minnesota's MEED Program
Major Program Features
While not strictly a displaced worker program, the MEED wage- 
subsidy program has developed in such a way that it offers a useful 
contrast to ETP as well as being of interest in its own right. MEED 
was created in 1983 by a Minnesota state legislature faced with 
double-digit unemployment rates coupled with a high percentage of 
unemployed workers who had exhausted their UI eligibility. The leg 
islature's response in MEED was a two-year program designed to 
create temporary jobs in the public sector and permanent jobs in 
the private sector. The program was initially funded at a hefty $70 
million for the July 1983 to June 1985 biennium using general tax 
revenues.
As originally conceived, MEED was fundamentally an emergency 
job creation program, with at least 60 percent of the jobs created 
expected to be in the public sector. The focus on public-sector job 
creation was due to the legislature's initial skepticism about the will 
ingness of private employers to participate in MEED. As the pro 
gram evolved, however, greater than expected participation of 
private employers led to a reversal in job placement objectives. By 
the second year of the program, 60 percent of jobs were designated 
to be in the private sector (a 70 percent private-sector placement rate 
was actually achieved); and an additional $30 million was appropri-
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ated by the legislature. MEED was made a permanent program in 
1985. Currently, a minimum of 75 percent of jobs created must be in 
the private sector; and $27 million was appropriated for MEED in 
the biennium ending June 30, 1987. 3 Temporary public-sector em 
ployment is presently viewed as a method for allowing the most dis- 
advantaged to acquire the work experience that will lead to eventual 
private-sector MEED placement.
The private-sector component of MEED is a wage-subsidy pro 
gram. The main features of the wage subsidy can be outlined as 
follows:
1. Eligible job seekers are those who are unemployed and are in 
eligible for or have exhausted either UI benefits or workers' compen 
sation. Priority is given to applicants eligible for General Assistance 
or Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and to farm 
families that can demonstrate severe financial need. MEED is there 
fore available to assist displaced workers who have exhausted their 
UI eligibility, but it is not restricted to only displaced workers.
2. MEED offers employers who hire targeted workers a subsidy 
of up to $4 per hour in wages and up to $1 per hour in fringe ben 
efits for a maximum of 1,040 hours over 26 weeks. The 26-week 
period can be extended up to one year for workers undergoing job 
training.
3. Participating employers are given a strong financial incentive 
to retain targeted workers for at least 12 months beyond the 6 
months of subsidized employment. If an employee is not retained on 
the job beyond the initial 6 months, the employer is required to re 
pay 70 percent of the amount received under the program. No repay 
ment is expected, on the other hand, if targeted workers are retained 
one year or longer beyond the subsidy period. A prorated portion of 
the subsidy must be repaid for employees retained less than one year.
4. Small businesses are given priority for MEED participation.
The MEED annual report covering the July 1985 to December 
1986 period indicates that 85 percent of private-sector participants 
were employed in unsubsidized jobs at the time of a 60-day follow- 
up survey after the completion of the subsidy period (see Minnesota 
Department of Jobs and Training 1987). Of workers in unsubsidized
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jobs, nearly 91 percent continued to be employed by the same firm, 
while about 9 percent changed employers following the subsidy pe 
riod. Average unsubsidized hourly wages for the two groups were 
$5.37 and $6.06, respectively. Most individuals employed under 
MEED qualify for the full subsidy over 26 weeks. Hence, average 
program cost per worker is relatively high at approximately $4,680.
Contrasts with ETP
Beyond the difference in economic conditions existing at their cre 
ation, the MEED program contrasts strongly with California's ETP in 
three additional respects. One contrast is in underlying philosophies. 
ETP's philosophy is that updated skills are a prerequisite for workers 
to obtain or retain jobs. Thus payments made to employers are viewed 
as reimbursement for training expenses incurred. In contrast, the ex 
plicit philosophy of MEED is that job seekers need employment, not 
retraining. If jobs are available, workers will be found to fill them. 
From this perspective, wage subsidies are primarily viewed as a job 
creation device. Nevertheless, MEED-funded jobs do appear in many 
cases to offer training opportunities. A 1985 survey (see Rangan 
1985) carried out by a coalition of state organizations, the Jobs Now 
Coalition, indicates that over 77 percent of participating private em 
ployers provided an affirmative answer to the question, "Did you 
provide any special training on- or off-the-job?"
A second difference between the two programs concerns the char 
acteristics of workers likely to receive assistance. The earlier discus 
sion of ETP outlined the incentive for training providers to cream in 
the trainee-selection process. MEED, on the other hand, targets the 
wage-subsidy to members of specific disadvantaged groups. A more 
recent 1987 Jobs Now Coalition survey (see Rode 1988) indicates, in 
fact, that MEED placements are disproportionately held by public 
assistance eligibles, women, and minorities. In particular, 54 percent 
of its placements during the 1985-87 biennium were public assis 
tance eligible, 42 percent were women, and 25 percent were minor 
ities (in a state with a total minority population of only 4 to 5 
percent). MEED is also increasingly directing its job placement 
activity to the balance of the state (i.e., counties outside the
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Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area) where unemployment is dis 
proportionately concentrated.
A final contrast deals with the mix of participating employers. As 
noted, relatively large California employers are more likely than 
smaller employers to participate in ETP. In line with MEED's legis 
lative priorities, on the other hand, small Minnesota employers are 
heavily involved in the program. In its 1987 survey, the Jobs Now 
Coalition reports the following information on the size distribution 
of participating employers (see Rode 1988: table 5):
Firm size Participating firms
5 or less 51.2%
6-20 29.9
21-50 9.7
51-99 4.8
100 or more 4.3
where firm size is measured by number of full-time employees. The 
really dramatic feature of these data is the heavy involvement of 
very small, start-up firms and the almost total noninvolvement of 
larger employers defined as firms with 100 or more workers. As 
large firms are known to pay higher wages on average than smaller 
firms (see, for example, Brown and Medoff 1989), the MEED wage- 
subsidy represents an especially large cut in labor costs to smaller 
employers. But even given this economic incentive favoring partici 
pation by small employers, it is interesting to note that the MEED 
experience runs counter to the usual finding that participation in em 
ployment subsidy programs is directly related to firm size. Using a 
USDOL survey of nearly 6,000 employers, Bishop and Montgomery 
(1986) report that both knowledge of and participation in the four 
targeted employment subsidy programs in operation in 1980 (the 
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, the WIN tax credit, and the CETA and 
WIN on-the-job-training programs) are strongly and positively corre 
lated with establishment size. The authors note, however, that the 
participation rates of employers, even for those knowledgeable about 
the programs, are very low.
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The Dayton Wage-Subsidy Experiment
It is also interesting to contrast the MEED wage-subsidy program 
with the results of a federally funded controlled experiment carried 
out in Dayton, Ohio during 1980-81. As described by Burtless (1985), 
the purpose of the experiment was to test the effectiveness of a tar 
geted wage-subsidy program in increasing the labor market success 
of disadvantaged workers defined as General Assistance and AFDC 
recipients. General Assistance eligibles were typically young men 
and women who were members of one- or two-person families in 
which no dependent children were present. Many were temporarily 
destitute. AFDC recipients were largely single women in their twen 
ties responsible for the support of one or more dependent children.
Individuals targeted by the Dayton program were randomly as 
signed to either of two treatment groups or to a control group. The 
first treatment group received vouchers that entitled their employers, 
upon making a hiring commitment, to a tax credit equal to 50 per 
cent of earnings paid during the first year of employment and 25 
percent of second-year earnings. The main goal of this treatment was 
to inform employers of clients' eligibility for tax credits under the 
then-existing Targeted Jobs Tax Credit and WIN tax credit programs. 
Rather than a tax credit, the vouchers received by members of the 
second treatment group authorized their employers to receive direct 
cash payments equal to the same percentages of the first- and 
second-year earnings. The difference between the two treatments is 
that for employers owing no federal income taxes, the tax credit 
vouchers were valueless, whereas the direct rebate subsidies would 
probably be worth claiming. Subsidy limits for both treatment 
groups were $3,000 and $1,500, respectively, for the first two years 
of employment. Members of the treatment groups and the control 
group received two weeks of job search training, which were fol 
lowed by six weeks of structured job search. The vouchers expired at 
the end of the six-week job search period.
The results of the experiment are shown in table 4.4. For the two 
treatment groups, only 13.0 percent of the tax credit group and 12.7 
percent of the direct cash payment group found employment during
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Table 4.4
Job Placement Rates in the Dayton Targeted 
Wage-Subsidy Experiment
Group
Tax credit voucher
Direct rebate voucher
Control
No. enrolled
247
299
262
No. placed 
in jobs
32
38
54
Placement 
rate
13.0%
12.7
20.6
Source: Burtless (1985: table 1).
the eight weeks of the experiment. Thus the direct cash payments 
did not increase labor market success relative to the tax credits. 
More important, the placement rates of both treatment groups were 
lower than the 20.6 percent rate obtained by the control group. 
Rather than improving the employment prospects of targeted work 
ers, it appears that the primary use of the vouchers by Dayton em 
ployers was as a labor market signal of potentially poor job 
performance. This explanation would account for both the lower 
placement rates observed for the treatment groups and the failure of 
the different subsidy payment mechanisms to make a difference. The 
disquieting implication of the experiment for wage-subsidy policies 
is that vouchers appear to have a stigmatizing effect in the sense that 
rather than easing the placement of target groups, the vouchers pro 
vide information which employers used to discriminate against the 
disadvantaged.
It is also of interest to note that of the 70 voucher holders who 
found employment, only 19, or little more than one-quarter, were 
employed by firms that requested certification for payment of the 
wage-subsidy. Burtless speculates that the 73 percent of employers 
who did not request payment may have considered the subsidies too 
small to justify the expense of filing for them. On the other hand, 
participants who succeeded in finding jobs may have refrained from 
telling employers that they were covered by a wage-subsidy pro 
gram, reasoning (correctly) that the information conveyed by the 
voucher would not increase their chance of finding employment. 
O'Neill (1982) also observes that the low utilization rates for sub-
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sidy programs that are narrowly targeted to particular socioeconomic 
groups may occur because targeted individuals who apply for jobs 
choose not to reveal to potential employers their membership in a 
target group.
Assessing MEED's Impact
Burtless's evaluation of the Dayton experiment and the historically 
low take-up rates for targeted wage-subsidies leave little room for 
optimism regarding the potential of these programs. MEED's record 
to date leads to a more positive conclusion. In particular, MEED 
appears to have been enthusiastically received by Minnesota employ 
ers, particularly small and relatively new businesses, despite the pri 
ority given to hiring hard-to-employ target groups. This is indicated 
by the shift in the program's emphasis toward private-sector job cre 
ation, its continued funding during the economic recovery following 
the 1981-82 recession, and surveys describing a high degree of em 
ployer satisfaction with MEED.
The reasons for the difference in employers' reactions to the Day 
ton and MEED programs can only be speculated upon. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that MEED officials, like those of California's ETP pro 
gram, recognize that it is critical to retain the support of the business 
community. From this perspective, the following considerations may 
play a role in MEED's comparative success.
1. MEED is promoted as a program to assist Minnesota's small 
businesses to grow and diversify. That is, MEED is sold as an eco 
nomic development tool rather than as a government program to as 
sist the unemployed and disadvantaged. In this connection, the 1987 
Jobs Now Coalition survey (see Rode 1988) points out that 81 per 
cent of surveyed employers responded affirmatively to a question 
that asked whether MEED enabled them to expand their production 
or scale of operations, 60 percent noted that the wage subsidy made 
it possible for them to invest in new capital equipment, and 54 per 
cent stated that MEED made it possible to diversify into new areas. 
Among firms that reported expansion of their workforces, 56 percent 
indicated that they would not have been able to create new jobs 
without MEED assistance, and another 4 percent suggested that their
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expansion would have been delayed without the program. A further 
breakdown of these data suggests that MEED assistance is particu 
larly beneficial to the growth of very small and new businesses. The 
same survey indicates, finally, that 86 percent of responding employ 
ers stated that they were "very satisfied" with their MEED employ 
ees, and only 23 percent mentioned that the subsidy failed to 
improve the performance of their business.
2. MEED officials have taken pains to keep their rules simple and 
administrative overhead low. The 1987 Jobs Now Coalition survey 
reports that 92 percent of responding employers felt that they were 
able to fill their jobs with a minimum of red tape, and 94 percent 
stated that they found the rules easy to understand. Both of these 
considerations are consistent with the policy conclusion reached by 
Bishop and Montgomery (1986) that the rate of employer usage of 
employment subsidy programs can be increased by vigorous promo 
tion by local administrators and by keeping the costs of participation 
as low as possible.
Most state-funded training programs are like the ETP program in 
imposing few constraints on employers in their selection of trainees. 
The MEED program demonstrates that it is possible to walk the fine 
line between targeting assistance to particular groups of disadvan- 
taged workers while at the same time enjoying widespread business 
support.
Summary
Although state-funded retraining initiatives are in operation in vir 
tually every state, state legislators have generally not opted to devote 
scarce resources to funding quantitative program evaluation analyses. 
One of the few exceptions to this statement is the evaluation of Cal 
ifornia's ETP program described in this chapter, and even this eval 
uation is flawed by the absence of a comparison group of 
nonparticipants. The general unavailability of evaluation evidence 
severely limits the information that state programs can provide on 
the first three of the four research question posed in chapter 1, 
namely, the issues of whether some types of training work better 
than others, whether some groups of workers benefit more from
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training than others, and whether effective training programs operate 
by increasing wages rates as well as by accelerating reemployment. 
Fortunately, however, the design of various state programs provides 
considerable insight into the fourth research question of what to train 
workers to do.
State-funded retraining programs are typically more tailored to 
meet the needs of individuals employers than federal programs, and 
this chapter focused attention on employer involvement in the ETP 
program and the program's stringent performance standards. Califor 
nia employers are encouraged to propose individual retraining 
projects for ETP funding. If a project is approved and a contract 
negotiated, the employer selects trainees according to its own speci 
fication, sets standards for successful program completion, and ap 
proves the training curriculum if an outside training provider is used. 
ETP's performance standards permit training providers to be reim 
bursed for training expenses only for those trainees who successfully 
complete the program and are placed in training-related jobs at stip 
ulated wages and are retained in those jobs for at least 90 days.
Allowing employers to participate in trainee selection and the use 
of performance-based contracting clearly should contribute to strong 
program performance in terms of job placement, and the preliminary 
pre-program/post-program evaluation of ETP indicates a sizable pro 
gram effect on annual earnings. Nevertheless, downside factors as 
sociated with the ETP approach are an increased likelihood that 
training providers will select those eligible workers least in need of 
retraining and the strong incentive given employers to retrain current 
employees, as opposed to offering training to unemployed workers.
In this context, the design and operation of Minnesota's MEED 
targeted wage-subsidy program is instructive. Despite an absence of 
quantitative evaluation evidence, available qualitative measures of 
program success for MEED suggest that it is possible to target assis 
tance to the hard-to-employ and still enjoy widespread business sup 
port, especially the support of small businessmen. In particular, 
Minnesota program officials appear to have successfully overcome 
the stigma associated by employers with program vouchers in the 
federally funded Dayton targeted wage-subsidy experiment.
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NOTES
1. More information on the broad range of proposed and ongoing state initiatives to assist 
displaced workers is found in Leigh (1989). In addition to vocational training and job search 
assistance, these initiatives include wage subsidies, reemployment bonuses, rapid-response 
team programs, enterprise zones, employee buy-one assistance, and unemployed entrepreneur 
programs.
2. Moore, Wilms, and Bolus (1988: tables 11 and 12) report for initially unemployed training 
completers that the average annual number of weeks unemployed fell from 6.2 weeks before 
training to 2.7 weeks after training. For initially employed training completers, the comparable 
change is from 2.4 weeks before training to 1.2 weeks after training.
3. MEED was appropriated $18 million for the July 1, 1987 to December 31, 1988 fiscal year. 
Indicating a possible phasing out of the program, just $4 million has been appropriated for 
July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1990.

5 
Canadian Training Programs
For over 60 years, the Canadian government has provided unem 
ployed workers with employment information and job placement ser 
vices delivered through a joint federal-provincial network of Canada 
Employment Centres. With the passage of the Adult Occupational 
Training (AOT) Act in 1966, the federal government initiated, in ad 
dition, a series of training programs intended to improve the reem- 
ployment prospects of adult workers. AOT programs included the 
purchase of classroom training from community colleges and other 
training institutions under the Canadian Manpower Training Program 
(CMTP) and on-the-job training purchased from private-sector em 
ployers under the Canadian Manpower Industrial Training Program 
(CMITP).
Following a critical evaluation of these programs in 1981 (the 
"Dodge Report"), the AOT Act was replaced by the National Train 
ing Act (NTA) passed in 1982. While continuing the earlier legisla 
tion's emphasis on increasing the earnings and employment potential 
of individual workers, the central objective of the NTA was to pro 
vide vocational training in order to better meet the skill requirements 
of a changing Canadian economy. Major component programs of the 
NTA were (1) the National Institutional Training Program, which 
continued the CMTP's focus on formal classroom training, (2) the 
National Industrial Training Program, which emphasized OJT, and 
(3) the Skills Growth Fund, which was intended to expand the ca 
pacity of the Canadian economy to train workers for jobs in shortage 
occupations. The National Institutional Training Program was by far 
the largest of the three NTA programs.
During the fall of 1984, a change in administrations at the federal 
level resulted in a comprehensive review of all federal labor market 
policies. The outcome of this review was the establishment in 1985 
of an umbrella program called the Canadian Jobs Strategy (CIS).
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This chapter begins with a brief overview of the component pro 
grams of the CIS that relate to adjustment problems faced by dis 
placed workers. This section is followed by discussions of two major 
quantitative evaluations of Canadian displaced worker programs. 
Considered first is a 1985 evaluation, carried out by Abt Associates 
of Canada, of CT programs funded by the National Institutional 
Training Program. Then the results of a 1981 evaluation of CMITP- 
funded OJT programs are examined. This second evaluation was 
conducted by the Program Evaluation Branch of Employment and 
Immigration Canada (EIC). Also briefly discussed in connection 
with the CMITP evaluation are results from an evaluation of the 
Youth Training Option program.
The Canadian Jobs Strategy
As summarized in table 5.1, the CIS consists of six component 
programs each of which is designed to meet the adjustment assis 
tance needs of a particular client group workers, employers, or 
communities. Like the state-funded programs discussed in chapter 4, 
CIS retraining assistance is available to employed workers at risk of 
being laid off if their skills are not upgraded, as well as to already 
unemployed workers. In addition, CIS programs emphasize involve 
ment by private-sector employers at the local level. The three CIS 
programs that appear to be most relevant to the needs of Canadian 
displaced workers are Job Development, Skill Investment, and Com 
munity Futures. 1
Job Development
This CIS program is designed to provide training and practical 
work experience for the long-term unemployed defined as individu 
als out of work 24 of the last 30 weeks who are referred to the 
program through a Canada Employment Centre. Funding both class 
room training and on-the-job training, the Job Development program 
is seen in table 5.1 to be the largest of the six programs in terms of 
1986-87 expenditures and number of participants. Job Development
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Table 5.1 
_____Component Programs of the Canadian Jobs Strategy______
1986-87 1986-87
Program expenditures participants 
name___________Description_____($millions)___(OOOs)
Skill Shortages
Skill Investment
Job Entry
Job Development
Community 
Futures
Innovations
Provides subsidies to em- 182.2 
ployers that train workers 
in high-demand skills 
that may be in short sup 
ply- 
Assists experienced 41.2 
workers to retain their 
jobs by updating their 
skills. Five options are 
available.
Assists youth in making 402.9 
the transition from school 
to work and women hav 
ing difficulty re-entering 
the labor market after an 
absence from the work 
force.
Assists the reemployment 768.7 
of the long-term unem 
ployed.
Assists single-industry 63.5 
communities hit by plant 
closings and mass lay 
offs.
Funds pilot projects and 14.8 
demonstration projects.________
70.9
17.8
149.0
176.2
3.1
Source: EIC (1988: 48-49 and 64-65).
training takes place in two forms. First, employers are assisted in 
developing projects that create three or more jobs lasting between 16 
and 52 weeks. Second, for the long-term unemployed who have par 
ticular employment disadvantages due to social or cultural barriers,
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assistance is provided to employers who develop individual-specific 
training slots lasting up to 52 weeks. Employers participating in 
either Job Development component are eligible to receive (1) up to 
60 percent of wages paid subject to a cap of $7.50 per hour with a 
weekly maximum of $300 per participant (up to 100 percent of 
wages for nonprofit employers), (2) up to $8 per participant training 
hour to cover the direct costs of CT provided either on-site or off-site 
at a community college or another recognized training institution, 
and (3) payment to cover the salaries received by administrative 
staff. In addition, employers who purchase special equipment or 
make structural renovations to the workplace to accommodate phys 
ically disabled employees can receive up to $10,000 per participant 
to defray these costs.
Skill Investment
Rather than waiting to intervene until after workers have been laid 
off, the Skill Investment program is designed to provide classroom 
and on-the-job training to enable experienced workers to retain their 
jobs through skill upgrading. Client groups are presented with five 
options. First, the Retraining option helps to pay wages and training 
costs for small businesses faced with rapid technological and market 
change. (Small businesses are defined as firms with less than 100 
employees.) Employers providing OJT are eligible to receive a wage 
subsidy of up to 60 percent of wages subject to ceilings per worker 
of $7.50 per hour and $300 per week. For providing CT opportuni 
ties, employers are eligible to receive up to $20 per hour for each 
participant training hour. The minimum length of training is 80 
hours, and agreements with the Skill Investment program can last up 
to three years. Special funds are also available to defray the costs of 
assisting the physically disabled.
The Continuing Employment option is directed to workers who 
are in danger of losing or who have lost their jobs within the past 
four months because of market or technological change. Current 
and new employers who employ participating workers are eligible 
to receive the same financial support as that provided under the Re 
training option. For the same target group of workers, a third op-
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tion Relocation and Travel Assistance offers up to $5,000 to 
meet the relocation and travel assistance requirements of program 
participants.
The fourth option Work Sharing attempts to avert temporary 
layoffs and to cushion the impact of permanent layoffs by providing 
partial compensation for the reduced earnings that accompany a 
shorter workweek. Under this voluntary program, employers con 
tinue to pay for regular hours worked, but participating workers re 
ceive UI benefits for time not worked up to a total of three days per 
week. These Work Sharing days may be used for training, with em 
ployers reimbursed for a major portion of direct training costs. Work 
Sharing agreements are normally expected to be in effect for 6 to 
26 weeks.
Finally, the Training Trust Fund option encourages unions and em 
ployee associations to combine with employers in establishing trust 
funds intended to finance workers' future training needs. Under 
agreements that can last up to three years, the Canadian federal gov 
ernment will supplement the trust funds by 50 percent of total con 
tributions in the first year and 33'/3 percent of total contributions in 
the second and third years. A similar concept proposed but not yet 
implemented in this country is the Individual Training Accounts 
(ITA) proposal. As described by the Office of Technology Assess 
ment (1986: 265-67), the basic idea underlying the ITA concept is 
the establishment of a fund privately financed by workers, employ 
ers, or both workers and employers that can be drawn upon to pay 
for additional educational or training investments. Workers who have 
lost their jobs or received notice of layoff would be eligible to with 
draw funds from their training accounts to assist them in making 
necessary transitions to new jobs or careers.
Community Futures
Instead of targeting on either workers or employers, this CIS pro 
gram is designed to assist nonmetropolitan, often one-industry com 
munities that have been hard hit by a plant closing or mass 
permanent layoff. The program revolves around Community Futures 
Committees composed of local workers, employers, and government
76 Canadian Training Programs
officials. Once established, these committees can choose from 
among the following options offered under the program:
1. Business Development Centres, which provide technical and 
advisory services to small businesses as well as loans of up to 
$75,000 per firm.
2. Income-maintenance support of $180 per week for one year to 
enable unemployed workers to start their own small businesses. 2
3. Assistance to employed, self-employed, and unemployed indi 
viduals to cover the direct costs of classroom training in approved 
training institutions.
4. Relocation and travel assistance to enable individuals or groups 
of workers to move to jobs elsewhere.
5. Community Initiative Funds, which will match funds obtained 
from other sources to finance local projects designed to generate new 
permanent jobs. These options are available to Community Futures 
Committees for up to five years.
Beyond the component programs of the CIS, an interesting policy 
change announced by the EIC in April 1989 is the creation of a new 
plan, the Labour Force Development Strategy, to change the allocation 
of Canadian UI expenditures. As in the U.S., the traditional role of 
Canada's UI program is the essentially passive one of providing tem 
porary income support to individuals who are involuntarily out of 
work. A very small percentage of total UI expenditures has been de 
voted to training and upgrading workers' skills. Beginning in 1990, 
the new plan calls for 10 percent of the UI program's total expendi 
tures (or $1.3 billion) to be redirected to a more active response to 
the needs of the unemployed. Some $800 million of this amount will 
be allocated to upgrading job skills; and about $500 million will go 
to improving UI benefits for maternity, sickness, and parental leave, 
as well as for workers over the age of 65 (EIC: 1989).
The NITP Evaluation
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the National Institu 
tional Training Program (NITP) was created in 1982 to fund CT slots 
in specific vocational courses offered by public and private voca 
tional centers, technical institutes, and community colleges. Chan-
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neling training purchases primarily through the individual provinces, 
training courses supported by the NITP were generally under 52 
weeks in length and did not lead to a diploma or degree. Also funded, 
in addition to the direct costs of training, was income-maintenance 
support for trainees. Canadian Employment Centres were given the 
task of enrolling and referring candidates to the program.
The NITP included the following component programs: (1) Skill 
Training, (2) Language Training, (3) Basic Training for Skill Devel 
opment (BTSD), (4) Apprenticeship Training, (5) Job Readiness 
Training, (6) Work Adjustment Training, and (7) Occupational Ori 
entation. BTSD courses were designed to upgrade basic skills in 
mathematics and communications so that participants could meet the 
academic requirements for entry into the Skill Training program or to 
proceed on to employment. 3 Skill Training courses were designed 
either to provide entry-level skills in a particular occupation or to 
upgrade or update the occupation-specific skills a worker already 
possessed. The 1985 program evaluation reported in Robinson et al. 
(1985) examines specifically the Skill Training and BTSD programs. 
NITP is thus unique among the projects and programs examined in 
this study in that net impact estimates are available for a remedial 
education program. For both NITP programs analyzed, the twofold 
objective of the evaluation is (1) to determine the impact of institu 
tional training on the employability and earnings of trainees, and (2) 
to examine the impact of institutional training on meeting the skill 
needs of the economy.
An interesting feature of the NITP evaluation is that it provides a 
comparison of program impact estimates obtained using pre- and 
post-training data on labor market outcomes for participants with 
program impacts estimated using a comparison sample of nonpartic- 
ipants. The participant sample includes about 1,500 Skill Training 
trainees and about 500 BTSD trainees who finished training courses 
in 1983-84. About 30 percent of all Skill trainees were women, 
while nearly half of all BTSD trainees were female. For both pro 
grams, more than three-quarters of all trainees were unemployed 
prior to training, and most trainees were in the 20-44 age bracket. 
Pre-program data for the sample of participants were obtained from
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administrative records, and a follow-up telephone survey conducted 
12 months after the completion of training provided post-training in 
formation.
Construction of the comparison samples began with the drawing 
of 2,000 nonparticipants matched to the characteristics of individu 
als in the Skill Training and BTSD participant samples. Matching 
criteria used in drawing the comparison samples include age, sex, 
province, years in the labor force, proportion of time employed and 
gross earnings in the year before training, and proportion of time 
employed and average annual gross earnings, 1972 to training start. 
The next step was to obtain addresses or telephone numbers so that 
the follow-up survey could be administered. Difficulties in making 
contact with many of the matched nonparticipants resulted in quite 
small comparison groups numbering just 55 individuals for the 
BTSC program and 165 individuals for the Skill Training program. 
The small size of the comparison samples relative to the size of the 
participant samples decreases the efficiency of the net impact esti 
mates provided in the Robinson et al. report.
Beginning with the empirical results for the Skill Training pro 
gram, the top half of table 5.2 indicates that in comparison to pre 
program levels, participants' annual earnings and time employed as 
a fraction of time in the labor force increased substantially. The per 
centage increases in these two outcome measures are roughly offset 
ting, so that the rise in average weekly earnings expressed as a 
percentage of pre-program earnings is a moderate 5.3 percent. Both 
earnings variables are deflated to 1981 dollars to abstract from the 
effect of inflation. For the comparison group of nonparticipants, siz 
able increases in the employment ratio and in annual earnings are 
also observed, reflecting Canada's strong recovery from its worst 
postwar recession in 1981-82. While the observed employment and 
earnings gains for nonparticipants are not as large as for partici 
pants, the percentage increase in weekly wages of 7.7 percent is 
slightly higher.
The regression coefficient estimates shown in the last column of 
the table measure program impacts after netting out improvements in 
the outcome measures that occurred for nonparticipants and control-
Table 5.2 
Net Impact Estimates for the NITP, Skill Training and BTSD Programs
Participants
Outcome measure
Time employed/time 
inLF 
Time employed/ 
calendar time 
Ave. weekly wage
Annual earnings
Time employed/time 
inLF 
Time employed/ 
calendar time 
Ave. weekly wage
Annual earnings
Year 
before 
training
41%
$262 
$6,573
26%
$178 
$3,912
Post- 
training
66%
$276 
$10,195
54%
$209 
$6,590
Difference 
(% change)
Skill Training
25% 
(61.0)
$14 
(5.3) 
$3,622 
(55.1)
BTSD
28% 
(107.7)
$31 
(17.4) 
$2,678 
(68.5)
Year 
before 
training
54%
$299 
$7,248
55%
$305 
$6,460
Comparison Group
Post- 
training
65%
$322 
$9,947
65%
$302 
$9,350
Difference 
(% change)
11% 
(20.4)
$23 
(7.7) 
$2,699 
(37.2)
10% 
(18.2)
-$3 
(-1.0) 
$2,890 
(44.7)
Regression 
coef. 
(t-statistic)
-0.27 
(-1.88) 
0.31 
(2.07) 
-17.87 
(-1.09) 
762.98 
(1.10)
0.80 
(-4.00) 
-0.38 
(-1.96) 
-49.27 
(-3.24) 
-1,408.57 
(-2.05)
Source: For Skill Training, Robinson et al. (1985: exhibits V-14 through V-18). For BTSD, Robinson et al. (1985: exhibits V-19 through V-23). 
Note: Weekly wages and annual earnings are converted to 1981 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
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ling for the effects of a number of personal characteristics and pre- 
training labor market variables. No attempt was made to control for 
self-selection bias. The regression results show that Skill Training 
fails to have a statistically significant effect on either earnings mea 
sure, while program participation does appear to increase the 
employment-to-calendar-time ratio but to decrease the employment- 
to-labor-force-time ratio. The suggestion is that program participa 
tion increases the extent of labor force participation. In total, these 
discouraging results for the Skill Training program reinforce the sim 
ilar findings obtained for classroom training programs in the U.S. 
demonstration projects.
The interpretation of comparable empirical results for BTSD train 
ees is clouded by the fact that the BTSD program was not necessar 
ily intended to prepare workers for immediate employment and the 
small size of the comparison sample. Despite these caveats, the pre 
program/post-training comparisons shown in the lower half of table 
5.2 indicate even larger percentage increases for BTSD trainees in 
each of the three outcome measures than those reported for Skill 
Training participants. The percentage increases for BTSD trainees 
are also considerably larger than those for the comparison sample. 
Nevertheless, the results of the regression analysis suggest that 
BTSD training significantly decreases weekly and annual earnings as 
well as both employment measures. It should be noted from the table 
that the wages and annual earnings of nonparticipants are on average 
much higher than the wages and annual earnings of BTSD trainees 
in both the pre-training and post-training periods. Despite the at 
tempt to match members of the comparison group to sample mem 
bers, it appears that in addition to its small size, the comparison 
group contains relatively few individuals with characteristics like 
those of BTSD trainees.
In view of the NITP's objective of meeting the skill requirements 
of the Canadian economy, it is also interesting to briefly review the 
analysis of the occupational distribution of training provided in the 
Abt Associates report. The analysis is limited to only Skill Training 
participants; and the three indicators of skill shortages applied in the 
analysis are (1) occupations in short supply as determined by the
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EIC's Program Evaluation Branch, (2) occupations considered to be 
of national importance, and (3) occupations with the highest ex 
pected growth rates. The evidence presented is mixed. With respect 
to the first indicator, fewer than 11 percent of trainees were in 
courses supplying training in what are classified as shortage occupa 
tions. Conversely, about 65 percent of trainees were trained in "sur 
plus" occupations. As measured by the other two indicators, 
however, there appears to be a substantial degree of targeting to 
shortage occupations. One further, but related, point of interest is 
that the Abt Associates analysis of data on the occupation of post- 
training employment indicates that the fraction of trainees who actu 
ally used their training on the job is quite low.
The CMITP Evaluation
In contrast to the NITP's emphasis on formal classroom training 
provided through Canada's educational infrastructure, the purpose of 
the earlier Canadian Manpower Industrial Training Program 
(CMITP) was to encourage employers to provide skill training 
(termed "industrial" training) either in a classroom setting or on the 
job. Eligible employers were reimbursed, either in whole or in part, 
for the direct training expenses incurred and for a fraction of train 
ees' wages. Since OJT was by far the more important source of 
training, however,4 the CMITP was basically a wage-subsidy pro 
gram with the level of the wage-subsidy hinging on the pre-program 
employment status of the trainee. Maximum subsidies were 40 per 
cent, 60 percent, and 85 percent, respectively, for employed, unem 
ployed, and special needs trainees. (Special needs trainees include 
persons who are physically or mentally handicapped, natives, or un 
able to find work due to social barriers such as alcoholism or police 
records.)
The Net Impact Analysis
The internal evaluation carried out by the Program Evaluation 
Branch of the EIC (1981) uses pre- and post-program data on the 
approximately 83,000 individuals trained during the 1978-79 period.
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Table 5.3
Comparison of Pre- and Post-Program Weekly Wages for the CMITP 
Program completion 
status and 
trainee category_____Pre-program Post-program % change
Program completers:
Employed
Unemployed
Special needs
Dropouts:
Employed
Unemployed
Special needs
$256
164
142
189
167
144
$322
234
200
277
236
211
25.8
42.7
40.8
46.6
41.3
46.5
Source: EIC (1981: table 5.2).
Employed trainees represented the largest group of trainees (48 per 
cent) and special needs trainees the smallest (8 percent). About 72 
percent of all trainees were men. Relative to the sample of NITP 
participants, the most noticeable characteristic of CMITP trainees is 
their youth. Fully 51 percent of all trainees fell into the 14-24 age 
bracket. Administrative records provided pre-program information 
for the 12 months prior to training, and a 12-month follow-up survey 
was used to supply post-program data. The training programs them 
selves varied in length by trainee category. Special needs trainees 
received, on average, the longest training (674 hours), followed in 
order by unemployed trainees (586 hours) and employed trainees 
(319 hours). Over half of the employed trainees were enrolled in 
short duration training of less than 160 hours.
In the absence of an externally selected comparison group, the 
only available evaluation methodology for the CMITP is a pre 
program/post-program comparison of average weekly wages for pro 
gram completers and dropouts. Data reported in the EIC evaluation 
on average hours worked per week indicates very little change before 
and after training, making it reasonable to treat growth in weekly 
earnings as gains in hourly wage rates. The percentage changes 
shown in table 5.3 for program completers indicate that both initially 
unemployed and special need trainees benefited from the program to 
a greater extent than did initially employed trainees. As compared to
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program dropouts, however, there is no evidence for any of the three 
trainee categories that program completion had a positive payoff ex 
pressed in terms of wage gains. Taken at face value, this result sup 
ports a similar finding obtained for OJT in the Buffalo Dislocated 
Worker Demonstration Project (see chapter 3). It should be empha 
sized, however, that the decision to drop out is not exogenously de 
termined, so there is good reason to expect that the effect of 
program completion may be understated. For example, it might be 
the case that trainees with above-average levels of ability are able to 
cut short their training program by locating a high-paying job with 
an alternative employer, thus biasing downward the measured effect 
of training.
Data on Participating Employers
The EIC evaluation also provides data on participating employers 
collected in a separate follow-up survey. Panel A of table 5.4 indi 
cates that very small firms (i.e., those employing less than 10 work 
ers) trained about 46 percent of both unemployed and special needs 
trainees as opposed to just 16 percent of employed trainees. On the 
other hand, firms in the two largest size categories (100-499 em 
ployees and 500 and more employees) trained nearly 60 percent of 
employed participants but only 19 percent and 12 percent, respec 
tively, of unemployed and special needs trainees. These results par 
allel the findings discussed in chapter 4 for the California ETP and 
Minnesota MEED initiatives that large employers are disproportion 
ately likely to participate in programs providing training to existing 
employees, while very small employers have a greater propensity to 
participate in programs directed at unemployed workers.
Panel B of table 5.4 provides a limited amount of information on 
the issue raised in chapter 4 of whether government-sponsored re 
training programs generate a net increase in the delivery of training 
services. In exploring this issue, the EIC employer follow-up survey 
posed several questions including the three reported in the table. The 
three questions were worded as follows:
Without the financial support of the program it would 
have been impossible for your firm to provide this training.
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Excluding this industrial training contract, has your firm 
provided training to its employees before?
In the absence of the CMITP, what alternative course of 
action would your firm have followed to acquire qualified 
workers in the training occupation? [Seven possible re 
sponses followed, and the respondent for each employer 
was to check only the single most important one.]
Employers' answers to the first two questions indicate that the net 
impact of CMITP on training opportunities depends strongly on firm 
size. Large firms of 500 or more employees were quite likely to have 
an ongoing training program, and only about one-quarter of these 
firms stated that the financial assistance of the program was neces 
sary for them to supply training to employees. At the other extreme, 
fully 28 percent of very small firms had no experience providing 
training services before CMITP, and 65 percent of these firms re 
ported that government financial assistance was essential for imple 
menting a training program.
The interpretation of responses to the final question asking about 
employer training behavior in the absence of the CMITP is compli 
cated by the availability of financial assistance to employers who are 
retraining existing employees as well as to employers hiring and 
training new employees. Of the four response options shown, the two 
that relate to employers responding to the program by expanding the 
level of their operations are the easiest to interpret and, at the same 
time, reinforce the impression that the CMITP has the largest net 
impact for small firms. Table 5.4 indicates that over 46 percent of 
firms in the largest size category stated that they would have pro 
vided the same hours of training to the same number of employees in 
the absence of the program, while only 23 percent of the very small 
firms reported that their behavior would have been unchanged in this 
way. Conversely, only 5 percent of the largest firms stated that they 
would not have hired and trained new workers in the program's ab 
sence, in contrast to 26 percent of very small firms.
Using the employer survey data, Simpson (1984) presents an 
econometric analysis which sheds some additional light on employ 
ers' willingness to supply industrial training and on the nature of that
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Table 5.4 
Effect of the CMITP on Training Opportunities,
by Size of Training Employer ____________ 
Employer size (in number of employees) 
1-9 10-49 50-99 100-499 500 +
A. Distribution of Trainees
Employed 
Unemployed 
Special needs
15.8% 
45.9 
46.4
18.1% 
28.4 
33.6
7.8% 
7.0 
7.9
23.5% 
10.5 
6.2
34.8% 
8.2 
5.9
B. Net Impact on Training
Financial aid was essen 
tial to provide training
Employer never provided
training before
In the absence of the pro 
gram the employer
would3
Have provided the
same training to the same
no. of employees
Have provided fewer
hours of training or
trained fewer workers
Not have expanded
employment and training
opportunities
Have hired an already
qualified employee
65.4
28.4
23.0
26.4
25.7
19.0
58.5
15.4
23.9
28.9
22.4
18.5
53.5
10.4
26.0
34.7
16.4
19.4
42.0
10.7
29.5
30.8
14.0
15.1
24.5
8.3
46.4
27.4
5.3
12.0
Source: EIC (1981: tables 3.3 and 7.7 and appendix tables E.I and E.2).
"Columns do not sum vertically to 100 percent because of the omission of an open-ended 
"other" response and of the response that the absence of the program would have no effect on 
training, recruiting qualified workers, or level of the firm's operation.
training. His key results are summarized in table 5.5, where estab 
lishment size is measured by gross revenue in millions of dollars, 
and CMITP assistance is captured by a dummy variable measuring 
whether or not the employer accepted the government wage-subsidy. 
The dependent variable is duration in months of industrial nonap- 
prenticeship training programs. Since months of industrial training
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Table 5.5
Estimated Impacts of Establishment Size and CMITP Assistance on 
Length of Company Training Programs
Explanatory 
variable
Establishment size 
CMITP assistance
All programs
0.0221* 
2.482*
Specific 
training
0.0246* 
3.038*
General 
training
-0.0047 
-0.164
Source: Simpson (1984: Table 2).
Notes: Estimates shown are Tobit slope estimates calculated using Tobit regression coeffi 
cients and evaluating the explanatory variables at their means, ^signifies that the underlying 
Tobit regression coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level.
can be zero or positive but not negative, Simpson uses the Tobit 
regression technique to obtain unbiased parameter estimates for an 
extensive list of explanatory variables. As the Tobit model is nonlin 
ear, slope estimates analogous to ordinary least squares coefficient 
estimates are calculated using the Tobit parameter estimates and 
evaluating all the explanatory variables at their means.
Looking at the first column of table 5.5, the significantly positive 
slope estimate for establishment size reinforces the conclusion that 
larger employers are more likely to provide training services. Hold 
ing constant the effect of size, acceptance of the CMITP wage- 
subsidy increases length of training programs by about two and one- 
half months on average. Unfortunately, Simpson's results do not 
differentiate between programs directed at unemployed workers and 
those intended to upgrade the skills of existing employees.
The second and third columns of table 5.5 attempt to pin down the 
nature of the training provided. Distinguishing specific from general 
training by employers' answers to a question asking whether vacan 
cies in a particular occupation might be filled by hiring outside per 
sonnel with the required skills, firm size is seen to be positively 
associated with specific but not general training. Similarly, receijpt 
of government assistance increases specific training by three months 
on average, but it has no appreciable effect on general training. The 
latter result is anticipated since human capital theory suggests that 
general training, since it is transferable between employers, will be 
fully paid for by trainees in the form of reduced wages. Thus, sub 
sidies to employers are expected to be effective only in cases where
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workers are unable to finance general training investments because 
of wage floors. On the other hand, the theory predicts that employ 
ers will share in the cost of specific training, so that a wage-subsidy 
program can potentially make a difference in available training op 
portunities.
The YTO Evaluation
One other, more recent, Canadian evaluation study that should be 
briefly mentioned is the EIC (1987) analysis of the Youth Training 
Option (YTO) of the Job Entry program. As noted in table 5.1, Job 
Entry is the component of the CJS designed to assist noncollege- 
bound youth in making the transition from school to work. The EIC 
evaluation examines the YTO program as it existed during its pilot 
project phase, which lasted from September 1984 to December 1985. 
During this period, a total of 4,320 individuals began training in 
YTO projects. Trainees were about equally divided by sex and about 
85 percent were between the ages of 18 and 21. Nearly 90 percent of 
trainees were unemployed immediately prior to program entry.
For the purpose of this monograph, the most noteworthy feature of 
the YTO is its goal of involving private-sector employers in actual 
program delivery. YTO supplied a combined program of formal 
classroom training coupled with on-the-job training furnished in an 
operating business termed a "training place host." The focal point 
of the program was the "managing coordinator" who, under con 
tract to the EIC, was responsible for developing and implementing 
proposals, arranging the off-site CT programs, and securing training 
place hosts to provide OJT. In addition, the managing coordinator 
was in charge of recruiting, selecting, and placing trainees and mon 
itoring their progress through the program. Managing coordinators 
could be private businesses or business-oriented groups such as 
Chambers of Commerce, government departments or agencies, 
school boards or schools, and community-oriented nonprofit organi 
zations.
In an effort to isolate the effect of the private-sector involvement 
in the program, the EIC's evaluation strategy compares the labor 
market performance of YTO trainees with that of a comparison
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group of NITP participants. As described earlier in this chapter, 
NITP featured very little employer participation since it was de 
signed to supply classroom training through Canada's existing edu 
cational infrastructure. Using samples of about 2,500 YTO trainees 
and about 2,000 NITP trainees, the average employment rate for 
YTO trainees is found to rise from 33.1 percent in the 12-month 
pre-training period to 69.8 percent in the 4-month post-training pe 
riod. This 36.7 percentage point increase dwarfs the 7.7 percent 
point increase measured over the same period for NITP participants. 
Making use of a regression framework to control for other measured 
characteristics of trainees, YTO participants are found to have expe 
rienced post-program employment rates 16 percentage points higher 
than NITP trainees.
Summary
This chapter began by providing an overview of the broad range of 
services offered displaced workers through the Canadian Jobs Strat 
egy. These services, like the state programs discussed in chapter 4, 
are available to employed workers at risk of layoff as well as to 
already unemployed workers. In addition to standard CT and OJT 
services directed to workers and employers, the Community Futures 
program of the CIS also provides a variety of forms of assistance to 
small communities hard hit by a plant closure or mass layoff.
The remainder of the chapter focused on the available evaluations 
of two major Canadian displaced worker programs. Regarding the 
labor market effectiveness of classroom and on-the-job training, 
these evaluations generally support the conclusions reached in chap 
ter 3 for the U.S. demonstration projects. Evidence for the NITP's 
Skill Training component using a comparison group of nonpartici- 
pants indicates that CT does not have a statistically significant im 
pact on either weekly wages or annual earnings. Similarly, the pre 
program/post-program comparison available for evaluating the 
CMITP fails to indicate for any of the three categories of workers 
considered (employed, unemployed, or special needs) that comple 
tion of an OJT program increased wages above the wage gains en 
joyed by program dropouts.
Does Training Work for Displaced Workers? 89
A unique feature of the NITP among the programs examined in 
this monograph is that it provided remedial education as well as skill 
training. Unfortunately, the effort to upgrade basic mathematics and 
communications skills in the BTSD component of the program is 
found to significantly decrease both earnings and employment oppor 
tunities. This result must, however, be interpreted with more than 
usual caution for at least two reasons. First, remedial education was 
not necessarily intended to prepare workers for immediate employ 
ment. Second, the appropriateness of the comparison group of non- 
participants may be questioned since, in addition to being very 
small, it appears to contain relatively few individuals with character 
istics like those of trainees.
An employer survey included as part of the CMITP evaluation 
also provides evidence supporting some of the conclusions reached 
in chapter 4. The internal EIC evaluation of these survey data rein 
forces a finding for Minnesota's MEED program indicating that 
small employers have a substantially greater propensity than larger 
employers to participate in retraining initiatives directed at unem 
ployed workers. On the other hand, large Canadian employers, like 
the large California employers in the ETP program, are dispropor 
tionately likely to participate in programs intended to upgrade the 
skills of existing employees. The CMITP employer survey data also 
suggest that among participating employers, it is small firms that are 
most likely to respond to a wage-subsidy program by generating a 
net increase in the delivery of training services. Although it is a 
training initiative directed at noncollege-bound youth rather than dis 
placed workers, finally, the evaluation of the YTO program provides 
some evidence that the involvement of private-sector employers in a 
combined CT-OJT program can make a substantial difference in the 
post-program employability of participants.
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NOTES
1. Later in the chapter, the Job Entry program is also discussed in connection with the eval 
uation of the Youth Training Option, which is a component program within Job Entry.
2. The available evidence on the effectiveness of programs in Britain and France and of a pilot 
project in Ohio that provide income-maintenance allowances and entrepreneurship training to 
unemployed workers who establish small businesses is examined in Leigh (1989: 126-31).
3. Under the Canadian Jobs Strategy established in 1985, BTSD is only provided as a prereq 
uisite for skill training programs.
4. About 84 percent of participating employers provided training by asking trainees to do the 
same work as other workers or to work as helpers in teams of experienced workers.
6 
Australian Training Programs
The Australian federal government has funded programs aimed 
specifically at assisting workers displaced by structural change since 
the early 1970s. The first of these programs was the Structural Adjust 
ment Assistance (SAA) program begun in 1973 and terminated in 1976. 
SAA was followed by the Labour Adjustment Training Arrangements 
(LATA) created in 1982. Finally, the Heavy Engineering Labour Ad 
justment Assistance program was introduced in 1986. This chapter 
begins with an overview of these displaced worker programs, includ 
ing a discussion of parallels between the SAA program and the U.S. 
Trade Adjustment Assistance program. Then the results of a 1986 
evaluation of the LATA program are examined (see Ho-Trieu 1986).
Basic Elements of the Programs
The SAA Program
Table 6.1 summarizes the three Australian displaced worker pro 
grams in terms of targeted workers and the adjustment assistance 
services offered. During its three-year existence, the SAA program 
provided income-maintenance allowances to workers and proprietors 
of small businesses made jobless by structural changes resulting 
from particular federal government policy decisions. These policy 
decisions included a 25 percent cut in tariffs carried out in July 1973 
and changes in a number of industry-specific assistance measures. 
Workers directly affected by these actions became eligible under 
SAA for six months of income-maintenance payments, with the size 
of the payment set equal to the individual's average wage over the 
previous six months subject to a cap of 1.5 times the average weekly 
earnings of all Australian workers.
As a policy response to trade liberalization and in its emphasis 
on income maintenance rather than retraining, the short history
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Table 6.1 
Australian Programs to Assist Displaced Workers
Program Targeted workers Program services
SAA (1973-76)
LATA (1982-present)
Heavy Engineering 
Labor Adjustment As 
sistance (1986- 
present)
Trade-displaced 
workers
Workers displaced 
from designated indus 
tries including steel, 
coal, and autos
Workers displaced in 
the heavy engineering 
industry
Income-maintenance 
allowances
Payment to schools for 
the direct costs of CT 
plus income- 
maintenance allow 
ances paid to trainees
(1) Payment to schools 
for the direct costs of 
CT plus income- 
maintenance allow 
ances paid to trainees
(2) Financial assis 
tance to employers to 
develop formal train 
ing programs
(3) Wage-subsidy pay 
ments to employers to 
encourage OJT
(4) Relocation assis 
tance to workers
of the SAA program offers striking parallels to the much longer 
lived Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program originally enacted 
by the U.S. Congress in 1962. TAA assistance included income- 
maintenance support above that provided by UI, and targeted work 
ers were those displaced from jobs in industries adversely affected by 
increased foreign competition arising from the relaxation of import 
restrictions. To counteract the expected effect of income maintenance 
in lengthening unemployment spells, TAA provided job search assis 
tance and relocation allowances to eligible displaced workers. Skill 
retraining was also available to assist in the replacement of specific 
human capital made obsolete by trade-related displacement.
For the first 12 years of TAA, a very low rate of participation 
reflected the program's stringent requirement that affected workers
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and firms demonstrate that trade liberalization led to increased im 
ports which, in turn, were the "major" cause of reduced domestic 
sales and lost jobs. The Trade Act of 1974 relaxed TAA requirements 
making eligibility easier and providing an even more generous in 
come support package over a longer time period. The combination 
of easier eligibility and improved benefits caused TAA expenditures 
and the number of workers served to increase rapidly over the next 
several years, peaking at more than $2.2 billion and over 500,000 
workers in 1980. Nevertheless, very few TAA recipients received 
any reemployment services. Bednarzik and Orr (1984) cite a General 
Accounting Office study indicating that over the 1975-78 period, 
less than 1 percent of program participants received ISA and reloca 
tion services and less than 4 percent received skill training.
Returning to Australia's SSA, a program review was conducted in 
1975 at the request of the Prime Minister, which resulted in the rec 
ommendation that SSA be discontinued. The review panel's negative 
recommendation was based on the following overlapping arguments 
(Bureau of Labour Market Research 1987: 194):
1. The special benefits to designated displaced workers reduce the 
mobility of those affected by structural change, thus decreasing the 
efficiency of the labor market.
2. Pressures on the government to extend benefits to other unem 
ployed workers are difficult to resist.
3. Those unemployed for reasons other than the particular policy 
decisions or through the indirect effects of these decisions are not 
eligible for program assistance.
4. The determination of whether particular workers are unem 
ployed as a result of the government's specific policy decisions is 
difficult and arbitrary.
For many of the same reasons, the available evaluations of TAA 
conclude with generally negative appraisals of the program. Neu 
mann (1978) reports that the higher income-maintenance benefits re 
ceived by trade displaced workers tended to increase unemployment 
duration and (for men only) post-unemployment earnings, and that 
training and counseling services had little effect on reemployment. 
Examining the post-1974 operation of TAA, Corson and Nicholson
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(1981) similarly conclude that the higher wage-replacement ratio 
lengthened unemployment spells. But they find no appreciable effect 
on post-unemployment earnings. Probably the strongest result pre 
sented by Corson and Nicholson is that the liberalization of eligibil 
ity conditions in 1974 caused a dramatic shift in the composition of 
TAA recipients. Rather than primarily benefiting workers formerly 
employed in older declining industries who could not reasonably ex 
pect to be recalled to their old jobs, nearly 72 percent of TAA re 
cipients ended their unemployment spells by returning to work for 
their previous employer. A reasonably high expectation of being able 
to return to one's old job is surely an important factor in explaining 
the very small percentages of recipients who made use of available 
reemployment services.
Congressional concern over TAA's high cost and the special treat 
ment of program recipients whose labor market circumstances did 
not appear to be that different from those of regular UI recipients led 
to new legislation in 1981 that tightened eligibility and reduced in 
come support payments. Authorization for TAA lapsed in 1985, but 
legislation passed in 1986 extended a much scaled-back version of 
the program for five more years. The 1986 legislation included a 
requirement that receipt of income support is conditional on partici 
pation in a job search program, and that workers are to be encour 
aged, but not required, to engage in skill training. Most recently, the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 amended both the 
Trade Act of 1974 as it affected TAA and Title III of JTPA. (As 
mentioned in chapter 1, the amendment to JTPA Title III is known 
as the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act 
or EDWAA.) The 1988 TAA amendment continues the requirement 
that income-maintenance support is conditional on participation in 
an approved training program.
The LATA Program
Despite the arguments in the 1975 review resulting in the Austra 
lian government's decision to terminate SAA, the LATA initiative 
created in 1982 is also a categorical program which was initially 
directed at workers displaced from jobs in the steel industry. Since
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1982, the program has been expanded to cover the coal mining in 
dustry in New South Wales, auto and auto parts manufacturers, and 
an International Harvester facility in Victoria. Workers displaced 
from their jobs in these industries are targeted for special assistance 
on the assumption that their displacement is especially likely to be 
the outcome of mass layoffs and plant closings. Large layoffs and 
plant closings present communities with the especially difficult prob 
lem of absorbing a large number of workers with similar skills who 
are all dumped on the local labor market at once.
The primary objective of the LATA program is to develop flexible 
training packages to meet the retraining needs of displaced workers, 
and there is no restriction placed on the course of study selected by 
trainees provided it is vocationally oriented. Training is provided in 
government or private educational institutions. In addition to cover 
ing the direct costs of classroom training, the LATA program sup 
plies an income-maintenance allowance to trainees equal to what an 
individual would otherwise have received in UI benefits plus a sup 
plementary adult training payment. Assistance is also provided to 
meet the costs of textbooks, equipment, and special course fees.
Heavy Engineering Labour Adjustment Assistance
This program is the labor market component of a broadly defined 
assistance package developed for the "heavy engineering" industry 
(i.e., the capital goods industry) by the Australian government. The 
other components include programs designed to assist industry em 
ployers in the areas of management efficiency, industrial develop 
ment, and new product marketing.
As indicated in table 6.1, the labor market component of the heavy 
engineering industry assistance package includes four elements. Simi 
lar to the LATA program, the first funds formal training for up to 12 
months for workers displaced from designated employers. In contrast 
to LATA, however, stronger emphasis is placed on the labor market 
relevance of the training curriculum selected. Eligible displaced 
workers also qualify for income-maintenance support.
The other three elements of the labor market program broaden 
substantially the scope of the services provided. The first of these
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appears to closely parallel the underlying philosophy of California's 
Employment Training Panel. That is, financial assistance is offered 
to encourage program-eligible employers to avoid layoffs by upgrad 
ing the skills of current employees through the establishment of for 
mal training programs. Second, to encourage on-the-job training, 
displaced workers are made eligible for an employer wage-subsidy 
for up to six months. Finally, displaced workers who are unable to 
find suitable employment in their local labor markets, but who have 
firm job offers elsewhere, are eligible for relocation assistance.
The 1986 LATA Evaluation Study
As part of the LATA evaluation project carried out by the Austra 
lian Bureau of Labour Market Research, two surveys were adminis 
tered to workers displaced from the General Motors-Holden (GMH) 
Acacia Ridge plant located in Brisbane. The first survey was con 
ducted one month before the plant closed in October 1984, and the 
second was carried out eight months after the closure. A total of 445 
GMH workers responded to both surveys. In many respects, these 
respondents closely resemble the auto workers surveyed in the 
Downriver project discussed in chapter 3. That is, the GMH workers 
are almost all males working in production jobs with families to sup 
port and considerable work experience. Average age and length of 
tenure for respondents are 42 years and 12 years, respectively.
LATA training courses available to GMH workers differed by type 
and length, and program participants were eligible to take as many 
different courses as they desired. Participants spent an average of 19 
weeks on training. The main distinction between the types of courses 
taken is whether or not the course had to do with driver training 
(i.e., bus, train, or truck driving; forklift driving; operation of earth 
moving equipment; and light vehicle driving). During the 8- to 9- 
month observation period available for analysis, 31 percent of re 
spondents chose to participate in one or more LATA training 
courses. About 54 percent of the courses involved driver training. 
The evaluation report by Ho-Trieu (1986) indicates that the probabil 
ity of LATA participation peaks for workers in their mid-thirties. In 
addition, individuals with spouses in paid work and those who pre-
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viously held supervisory or managerial positions are less likely to 
participate than other comparable workers.
The only labor market outcome variable examined by Ho-Trieu is 
job placement measured as full-time or part-time employment at the 
time of the follow-up interview. Net impact estimates are obtained 
by comparing the placement success of former GMH workers who 
chose to participate in LATA with the placement of those who chose 
not to participate. An obvious problem with this methodology is self- 
selection in the determination of program participation. A second 
problem is that the short length of the observation period implies 
that the net impact of longer training courses will be downwardly 
biased because of the reduced time available for job search. This 
source of bias was considered earlier in chapter 3 in the discussion 
of skill training in the Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration 
projects. There the length of the observation period was 12 months.
With these caveats in mind, and recognizing also that the underly 
ing parameter estimates have large standard errors, table 6.2 presents 
net impact estimates of LATA training holding constant the effects of 
age, marital status, number of children, and job search technique 
used (i.e., family, friends, and employment agencies; trade unions; 
newspapers; the Australian employment service; and direct employer 
contract). The partial probability estimates shown are calculated 
from the results of a logistic regression equation, and the estimates 
are interpreted as measuring changes in the probability that a typical 
former GMH worker will be reemployed by the end of the observa 
tion period. In the first column, consequently, a worker who took a 
training course of one to four weeks would have a placement proba 
bility 9 percentage points less than what his placement probability 
would have been had he opted not to undergo training. But if the 
short training course involves driver training, the net effect of LATA 
would be to increase the probability of reemployment by four per 
centage points (=  9% + 13%). The large negative estimate for 
courses longer than eight weeks is quite likely the result of the neg 
ative bias associated with a reduction in available job search time.
On the argument that it is not possible to accurately assess the 
impact of longer training courses, the second column of table 6.2
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Table 6.2 
Net Impact Estimates of LATA Training on the Probability
____________________of Reemployment_________________________
Excluding participants 
Training variables_____All participants___with longer training
Length of training:
1-4 weeks -9 1
o
5-8 weeks  6 J
Longer than 8 weeks -33   
Driver training 13 9 
Other training_________________ ____________ 7________
Source: Ho-Trieu (1986: tables 6.4 and 6.5).
Note: Other explanatory variables include age, marital status, number of children, and job 
search technique. In the second column, participants with total training of more than eight 
weeks are excluded from the regression, and training of eight weeks or less is treated as a 
continuous variable.   indicates that the variable is excluded from the regression.
reports probability estimates excluding LATA participants who took 
training courses exceeding eight weeks in total length. These results 
serve to emphasize the much larger impact of courses involving 
driver training relative to other LATA courses. Ho-Trieu (1986: 71  
72) speculates that possible reasons for the strong impact of driver 
training include (1) a closer trainer-trainee relationship in driving 
courses, (2) the fact that driving skills can be learned independently 
of other factors such as English proficiency and basic academic 
skills, and (3) the greater opportunity offered those with driving 
qualifications for starting their own contracting businesses.
Summary
Described in this chapter are three programs funded by the Aus 
tralian federal government to supply adjustment assistance services 
to displaced workers. The SAA program in effect from 1973 to 1976 
is similar to the U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance program in re 
stricting program services to trade-displaced workers and in provid 
ing eligible workers with income-maintenance allowances. The other 
two programs LATA and the Heavy Engineering Labour Adjust 
ment Assistance program provide income maintenance and skill
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training to workers displaced from a few selected industries. Both of 
these programs are still in operation.
Among the three Australian programs, only LATA has been sub 
jected to program evaluation; and this evaluation is limited to a 
participant-nonparticipant comparison with the associated selection 
bias problem. The evaluation results reported indicate that the type 
of training provided (i.e., driver training) makes a substantial differ 
ence in the net impact analysis. In this respect, the LATA results 
reinforce a conclusion reached in chapter 3 for the Texas WAD 
projects. This conclusion is simply that training curriculums offered 
must match the interests and backgrounds of targeted workers to 
be effective.

7 
Conclusion
This study examined evaluation evidence for nine different demon 
stration projects and operating programs on the labor market effec 
tiveness of public retraining programs for displaced workers. Within 
the United States, quantitative results were presented in chapter 3 for 
four major, federally funded demonstration projects carried out during 
the 1980s. In chronological order, these are the Downriver program, 
the Buffalo program of the Dislocated Worker Demonstration Project, 
the Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration, and the New Jersey UI 
Reemployment Demonstration. Although all four of the demonstra 
tions have the common objective of evaluating alternative reemploy- 
ment services including job search assistance, classroom training, and 
on-the-job training, they differ considerably in terms of geographic lo 
cation, sample size, experimental design, and the target populations 
of displaced workers served. Turning from federal to state programs, 
examined in chapter 4 was the quantitative and qualitative evidence 
available for ongoing programs in California and Minnesota. Califor 
nia's Employment Training Panel funds skill training programs tailored 
to meet the needs of specific employers, while the Minnesota Em 
ployment and Economic Development program is a targeted wage- 
subsidy initiative designed to assist the growth of small businesses.
Beyond the borders of the U.S., evaluation evidence was discussed 
in chapters 5 and 6 for two Canadian programs and for an Australian 
program. The Canadian National Institutional Training Program pro 
vided displaced workers with classroom training, and the earlier Ca 
nadian Manpower Industrial Training Program program funded on-the- 
job training. The NITP is particularly noteworthy in that it supplied 
displaced workers with remedial education as well as skill training. Still 
in effect, Australia's Labour Adjustment Training Arrangements pro 
gram targets CT services and income-maintenance allowances to work 
ers displaced from selected industries including steel and coal mining.
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Supplementing the evaluation evidence for these nine programs 
are net impact estimates obtained for three additional government 
programs not specifically designed to assist displaced workers. Con 
sidered in chapter 2 were the evaluations carried out for programs 
funded by CETA. In operation between 1973 and 1982, the broad- 
based CETA program went beyond assistance to displaced workers 
to include reemployment services and public-sector job creation di 
rected toward disadvantaged workers and the cyclically unemployed. 
Included in the discussion of Minnesota's MEED program in chapter 
4 were quantitative results from an evaluation study carried out for 
the Dayton targeted wage-subsidy experiment. Finally, evaluation 
evidence for the Canadian Youth Training Option was briefly consid 
ered in chapter 5 in connection with the CMITP program.
In this concluding chapter, I attempt to make sense of the net im 
pact estimates and other evidence obtained for these projects and 
programs by first asking what these results have to say regarding the 
four policy questions posed in chapter 1. Then some suggestions are 
made regarding areas for further research.
Major Policy Questions
Question 1: Do some types of training work better than others?
Beginning with the evidence provided by the U.S. displaced 
worker demonstrations, the Buffalo, Texas WAD, and New Jersey 
projects indicate unambiguously that job search assistance strongly 
affects in the intended direction a variety of labor market outcomes, 
including earnings, placement and employment rates, and level of UI 
benefits. ISA allows for quick intervention before workers disperse 
after layoffs and plant closings; and, given its low cost per worker, 
the evidence suggests also that ISA services are cost effective. In 
view of the practical difficulties addressed in the New Jersey Dem 
onstration of distinguishing early in the post-layoff period displaced 
workers from other unemployed workers, JSA's low cost offers the 
additional advantage of making it feasible to supply assistance even 
to those unemployed workers who turn out ex post to have little dif 
ficulty in locating new jobs or are recalled to their old jobs.
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For the other major reemployment services, evidence gathered for 
all four U.S. demonstration projects indicates that classroom training 
fails to have a sizable incremental effect on earnings and employ 
ment above that of ISA-only. In particular, it certainly does not ap 
pear that the additional effect of classroom training is large enough 
to offset the higher cost of these services. The authors of the evalu 
ation reports are plainly troubled by these unexpectedly weak results 
for CT, and they offer a number of qualifications to their findings. To 
anticipate the discussion of Question 4, these caveats include the fol 
lowing: (1) small sample sizes; (2) the problem that participants un 
dergoing skill training have relatively little time left to receive 
placement assistance (given demonstration periods of fixed length); 
(3) the difficulty of finding training providers capable of putting to 
gether high-quality, short-duration training courses on short notice; 
and (4) the possibility that the classroom training provided is either 
not saleable in the local labor market or not of particular interest to 
targeted workers. Results obtained for the Australian LATA program 
reinforce the second caveat that net impact estimates for longer skill 
training programs may be downwardly biased due to the reduced 
length of time available for job search.
Regarding on-the-job training, it is interesting to note that the Sec 
retary of Labor's Task Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker 
Dislocation (1986: 33-34) recommends that OJT rather than class 
room training be regarded as the primary source of long-term skill 
upgrading for displaced workers. The CETA evaluations summarized 
in chapter 2 support this recommendation by showing generally larger 
net impact estimates for OJT than for CT. Among the four demon 
stration programs, the Buffalo project is the only one with enough 
participants placed in OJT slots to provide reasonably reliable esti 
mates of the net impact of on-the-job training. Contrary to the CETA 
results, OJT fails to have a consistently positive effect on earnings. 
Nor does it have much of an impact on employment rates. Since OJT 
was primarily used in the Buffalo program as a placement tool, it 
appears that this service was of little value for program participants.
Although the evaluations of national Canadian and Australian re 
training programs are not as methodologically rigorous, their findings
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regarding CT and OJT services support the generally negative find 
ings yielded by the U.S. demonstrations. Using an externally selected 
comparison sample, skill training provided in a classroom setting is 
found in the Canadian NITP program not to significantly affect either 
weekly wages or annual earnings. In addition, the participant-non- 
participant comparison available for the Australian LATA program 
suggests that classroom training actually reduces the probability of re- 
employment during the observation period (although there is evidence 
that the training curriculum makes a difference). Similarly, the pre 
program/post-program comparison available for program completers 
and dropouts for Canada's CMITP indicates that OJT had little im 
pact on weekly wages. Given the present state of our knowledge, it 
seems reasonable to conclude, along with Bloom and Kulik (1986: 
181), that skill training should be offered sparingly for well-specified 
needs and only where adequate local training resources are present. 
Beyond the three major retraining services, the Basic Training for 
Skill Development (BTSD) component of the Canadian NITP is the 
only program discussed in this monograph that permits an examination 
of the labor market effectiveness of remedial education. Unfortu 
nately, Canada's effort to upgrade basic mathematics and communi 
cations skills is found to significantly decrease both earnings and 
employment opportunities. There are at least two reasons, however, 
to expect these estimates to be downwardly biased. One is that BTSD 
training was not necessarily intended to prepare workers for imme 
diate employment. The second reason is that the BTSD comparison 
group appears to be inappropriate since, in addition to being very 
small, it contains relatively few individuals with characteristics like 
those of trainees.
Question 2: Do some groups of workers benefit more from 
training than others?
The Texas WAD projects probably provide the best evidence of all 
of the demonstration projects and programs examined regarding dif 
ferential program effects across workers classified by gender and 
race or ethnicity. In terms of earnings and employment, female par 
ticipants in the El Paso WAD project are found to enjoy much larger
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net impact estimates than males in both the El Paso and Houston 
projects. More specifically, female participants in El Paso experi 
enced a program-induced gain in annual earnings of $1,070 during 
the 1983-85 period; while the gains in annual earnings for men in 
Houston and El Paso were only $750 and $770, respectively. This 
difference between program sites is even more impressive when it is 
recognized that a majority of male Houston participants are white, 
whereas female El Paso participants are largely Hispanic.
Reinforcing the gender difference in the WAD results is evidence 
from the CETA evaluations and the Buffalo project indicating larger 
program effects for women than men. The Buffalo project also sug 
gests that little difference in net impact estimates exists for blacks 
and whites, but that workers under age 45 benefit more from pro 
gram services than do older workers.
Rather than race/ethnicity and sex differences, the results of the 
New Jersey Demonstration disaggregated by population subgroups 
emphasize the distinction between workers with marketable skills 
and workers facing long-term, structural reemployment problems. 
Clerical and other white-collar workers are examples of the former 
group, while blue-collar workers laid off from durable goods manu 
facturing jobs typify the latter. The evaluation report by Corson et 
al. (1989) indicates that program services were primarily of assis 
tance to workers with marketable skills, a finding that is consistent 
with the New Jersey Demonstration's objective of encouraging rapid 
reemployment. As mentioned in chapter 1, however, a case can be 
made that it is the sizable minority of displaced workers who are at 
risk of lengthy spells of joblessness to whom adjustment assistance 
should be targeted. These individuals are likely to require longer- 
run, more intensive services.
Question 3: To the extent that training improves reemployment 
prospects, does it work by increasing post-training wage rates 
or by reducing the duration of unemployment?
For all program services combined, the Buffalo project permits the 
calculation of short-run program effects on weekly hours and aver 
age weekly earnings. The larger percentage effect on average weekly
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earnings than weekly hours suggests that the Buffalo program 
boosted hourly wages for those reemployed during the first six post- 
program months. Buttressing this finding, an analysis of state admin 
istrative data indicates for the New Jersey Demonstration that each 
of the three program treatments (i.e., ISA-only, ISA plus retraining, 
and ISA plus a reemployment bonus) had a small positive impact on 
the wages of reemployed workers.
In contrast, the more detailed quarter-by-quarter program impact 
estimates calculated for the Texas WAD projects and the New Jersey 
Demonstration indicate that this short-run positive effect on wage 
rates does not persist over time. For both men and women, the time 
pattern of the WAD results shows that the program increased quar 
terly earnings in the first and second quarters, followed by gradually 
decaying impacts for subsequent quarters. Similar results broken 
down by program treatment are obtained using follow-up interview 
data on employment and earnings in the New Jersey project. Thus, 
while the reemployment process was speeded up by program services 
in both demonstrations, participants' employment opportunities ap 
pear ultimately to be no better and their wages no higher than those 
of the members of the control group. There is little convincing evi 
dence, in other words, that program services in either the Texas 
WAD or the New Jersey Demonstration increased labor productivity. 
The evaluation of on-the-job training in the Canadian CMITP also 
suggests, as noted, that program completion had little impact in 
terms of wage gains.
Question 4: Referring specifically to vocational training, how do 
we know what to train workers to do?
An important contribution of the displaced worker demonstration 
projects is to make apparent the difficulty in a short-duration dem 
onstration of designing solid training curricula that meet the market 
test of providing saleable skills. Of the four U.S. demonstrations, 
Downriver program planners probably paid the most attention to the 
problem of providing retraining in occupations expected to be in high 
demand. Yet, as described in chapter 3 and noted earlier, skill training 
is not found to have significantly improved Downriver participants'
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reemployment prospects above the assistance provided by ISA. Cor- 
son, Maynard, and Wichita (1984: 16) note for all six sites of the 
Dislocated Worker Demonstration Project that key lessons learned are 
that (1) many displaced workers will not be able to adapt to class 
room training, and (2) despite attempts to base course selection on 
labor market data, many successful program graduates may not be 
able to locate training-related jobs. These authors go on to recom 
mend the use of performance-based contracting with training vendors 
as one way to improve participant screening in determining access to 
CT programs and to increase post-program placement and job reten 
tion rates. The WAD demonstration also emphasizes that one reason 
for low program take-up rates and modest net impact estimates is 
that CT curricula may not match the backgrounds and perceived 
needs of client workers. Evaluation results obtained for the Austra 
lian LATA program underscore the point that the type of training 
provided can make a substantial difference in net impact estimates.
State-funded retraining programs are typically more tailored to 
meet the needs of individual employers than federal programs, and 
chapter 4 focused attention on employer involvement in California's 
ETP and the program's stringent performance standards. California 
employers are encouraged to propose individual retraining projects 
for ETP funding. If a project is approved and a contract negotiated, 
the employer selects trainees according to its own specification, sets 
standards for successful program completion, and approves the train 
ing curriculum if an outside training provider is used. ETP's perfor 
mance standards permit training providers to be reimbursed for 
training expenses only for those trainees who successfully complete 
the program and are placed in training-related jobs at stipulated 
wages and are retained in those jobs for at least 90 days.
Allowing employers to participate in trainee selection and the use 
of performance-based contracting clearly should contribute to strong 
program performance in terms of job placement, and preliminary 
empirical results obtained for ETP indicate a sizable program effect 
on annual earnings. Although it is a training initiative directed at 
noncollege-bound youth rather than displaced workers, the evalua 
tion of the Canadian YTO program provides additional evidence that
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the involvement of private-sector employers in a combined CT-OJT 
program can make a substantial difference in the post-program em- 
ployability of participants. Nevertheless, the ETP approach has been 
subjected to a number of criticisms. One of these is that program 
performance standards increase the likelihood that training providers 
will select those eligible workers least in need of retraining. A sec 
ond criticism centers on the strong incentive given employers to 
retrain current employees, as opposed to offering training to unem 
ployed workers. A consequence of the observed increase over time in 
the retraining of the employed is that ETP may be substituting public 
funds for the training investments employers would have made them 
selves in the program's absence.
In the context of these criticisms, an important outcome of Min 
nesota's MEED wage-subsidy program is its demonstration that it is 
possible to target assistance to the hard-to-employ and still enjoy 
widespread business support, particularly the support of small busi 
nessmen. That is, Minnesota program officials appear to have suc 
cessfully overcome the stigma associated by employers with program 
vouchers in the Dayton targeted wage-subsidy experiment. The inter 
nal evaluation of Canada's CMITP program reinforces the MEED 
evidence in indicating that small employers have a substantially 
greater propensity than larger employers to participate in retraining 
initiatives directed at unemployed workers. On the other hand, large 
Canadian employers, like large California employers, are dispropor 
tionately likely to participate in programs intended to upgrade the 
skills of existing employees. The CMITP employer survey data also 
suggest that among participating employers, it is small firms that are 
most likely to respond to a wage-subsidy program by generating a 
net increase in the delivery of training services.
Agenda for Future Research
The recommendation that emerges most strongly from the empir 
ical evidence analyzed in this monograph is that ISA should be the 
core service on the menu of adjustment assistance services offered 
displaced workers. With respect to other services, however, the evi 
dence is not as conclusive; and there appear to be several topics on
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which future research is needed. Important items on the agenda for 
future research include the following.
1. It is reasonable to conclude that, if offered at all, skill training 
provided in a classroom setting should be limited to carefully 
screened trainees whose specific needs can be adequately matched 
with local training resources. But even in this highly controlled situ 
ation, as noted by Bloom and Kulik (1986: 182), whether a high 
quality, targeted skill training program can be cost effective is an 
open question and should be the subject of further research.
2. A closely related issue is the recommendation of the Secretary 
of Labor's Task Force (1986: 34) that classroom training be matched 
to the needs of identified employers and that contracts with training 
providers be performance-based. A clear benefit of placing these con 
straints on the design of CT programs is the associated increase in job 
placement. Nevertheless, this benefit needs to be carefully weighed 
against the potential costs of creaming in the trainee selection pro 
cess and of providing a windfall to employers who would have oth 
erwise supplied retraining at their own expense. Further research, 
perhaps building on the experience of California's ETP, on how to 
design CT programs to minimize these costs would be helpful.
3. The Secretary of Labor's Task Force (1986: 34) also strongly 
recommends that OJT, as opposed to CT, be the preferred method of 
long-term skill training. Yet, the limited empirical evidence reviewed 
here suggests, at best, a lukewarm assessment of the effectiveness of 
on-the-job training. A key issue in the design of OJT programs 
involves the incentives necessary to stimulate employer interest in 
providing retraining opportunities; and further examination of pro 
grams, like Minnesota's MEED, which appear to be well received by 
employers, would be of value.
4. Many studies of the reemployment assistance needs of displaced 
workers include a recommendation that strengthening basic skills is 
essential to allow workers to cope with rapid technological change 
and increased international competitiveness (see, for example, Cyert 
and Mowery 1987: 185-86 and the Secretary of Labor's Task Force 
1986: 33-34). Despite the suggestion in the Corson et al. (1989) 
evaluation of the New Jersey Demonstration that remedial education
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may be needed for displaced workers who face long-term, structural 
reemployment problems, only the Canadian NITP of the programs 
examined here furnishes quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of 
this program service. The negative results of the Robinson et al. 
(1985) evaluation of NITP's remedial education component must be 
interpreted recognizing the caveats noted earlier in this chapter. An 
important topic for further research is identification of the proper 
objective function for remedial training programs, followed by addi 
tional evaluation evidence on the determinants of success and failure 
of these programs.
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